THE FORTNIGHTLY

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AFTER THE WAR—WHAT THEN?

BY VISCOUNT SAMUEL

THE work to be done after the war is in three spheres. There are international relations—World Planning. Within that there is the task of re-moulding each national society in the spirit of the times—Social Reconstruction. Within that again there is the reform of the physical environment—Town and Country Planning. Vast tasks indeed confront modern man.

As to the first, the Atlantic Charter sets the pattern. Endorsed by all the United Nations, the Charter gives the general outline. At this stage more than that is not possible. For a definite statement of specific Peace Aims it would not be enough for the leaders of two nations, even though the greatest, to meet together on a ship. Every allied State would expect to be consulted, and every British Dominion. All political parties in all of them would have to be allowed their say. Full parliamentary debates, and something in the nature of a preliminary Peace Conference would be necessary before an authoritative declaration could be made.

Are we to aim at a World Federation? Or a Federation among the Allies? Or a Federal Union between the British Commonwealth and the United States only? Federation means a combined State; with a central Parliament elected directly by all the federated peoples, and a joint Government acting, in specified matters, for them all. Unless that is meant the word Federation is the wrong word, introduces confusion and should not be used. We have to envisage, in any Federation, a unitary Government and Parliament, charged with sole control of Foreign Policy, Peace and War, Defence, and the finances needed for Defence. They must be empowered to decide those matters, if necessary by majority vote, and without the concurrence of the Governments and Parliaments of any of the member States. That is the essence of Federation. How many years—or months—would such a system last?

Or should we aim rather at Confederations?—that is to say permanent unions, for defined purposes, of two States or more; each retaining its own sovereignty, its own Government and

Parliament; drawing from them representatives or delegations to form a joint executive and a joint legislature. This is the plan now being worked out by the Governments concerned for a Polish-Czechoslovakian Confederation and for a Greek-Yugoslav Confederation: with the prospect of a union between the two, and of other adhesions later. Is that to be the model for Scandinavia, the Baltic States, Belgium and Holland; and above all for Britain and the United States—if the American people were prepared to accept so thorough an "entanglement"?

How is the great economic purpose proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter—the equal access of all countries to the trade of the world—to be achieved in practice? Is there to be a free uncontrolled movement of goods everywhere; and if so, how are vital national industries in the democratic countries to be saved from ruin by rival industries elsewhere, conducted by State or semi-State organizations, and fostered from national revenues held in the same hand?

All these difficult matters, and many more, will need to be considered before the definite peace aims of the United Nations can be officially proclaimed. Consideration involves consultation. Consultation cannot help giving rise to controversy. Controversy must certainly mean delay, and would very likely mean the break-up of present unity—unity between the nations, and within the nations. By all means let public opinion everywhere concern itself with these formidable issues. Let Associations and Leagues and Institutes and Party Conferences study them, and crystallize their views. But where Governments are concerned—bearing actual responsibility, seeking to avoid dissension and maintain a common front—at present broad general indications only are possible. For the time being we must be content with the Atlantic Charter.

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Coming to the second sphere, Social Reconstruction, and limiting ourselves to our own country, we are faced, in the main, by nothing new. During the present century there has been a continuous effort for social progress. It has achieved great results. A marked rise in the standard of living of the people; better education, better health, a lower death-rate; the creation of a great system of social insurance; four million new houses, providing for a third of the population, built since the last war; an improvement in industrial relations—these are no small gains. But there have been failures and deficiencies also. Chronic unemployment, except under the

feverish stimulus of war, has been the most conspicuous. The deep poverty of a large fraction of the population; the hard, comfortless lives of many more; the luxury of the rich in striking contrast, and the injustice of the extreme inequality of incomes—these are grave defects in our social system. The standard of education, which seems high compared with fifty years ago, will seem low, we may be sure, when it is viewed from the standpoint of fifty years hence. There is still bad housing; still much avoidable sickness. The status of the workman in industry is still, for the most part, one of subordination and not of partnership.

The nation has long been aware of these things, and pressing for reforms. The greater sense of unity and the quickened tempo of the national life brought about by the war, has made that awareness more acute and has given fresh force to the movement. When the war is over this, it is easy to see, will form the main current in our public affairs.

The phrase "A Better Britain" is a good phrase. It expresses pithily a policy that is easily understood. The principle is simple; but the application must be complex. There is not one measure involved here, but a great variety. Those who think that the task can be entrusted to "a Minister of Reconstruction" misconceive the situation. The work cannot be accomplished, or even directed, by any one Department of Government. All the domestic Departments are concerned, and the direction can only come from the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Apart from Foreign and Imperial Affairs and Defence, here is the principal work for Governments and Parliaments in the coming years.

While the war is raging, and the attention of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet must obviously be given to the prosecution of the war—in priority to all else, and often to the exclusion of all else—the management of other affairs, including any necessary preparation for post-war activities, must be delegated to groups of Ministers. There is a Home Affairs Committee of the Cabinet, presided over by the Lord President of the Council or by the Lord Chancellor, which considers questions of legislation and administration not directly touching the conduct of the war.

For the time being this Committee on Reconstruction has been obliged to give a great part of its attention to questions that will be the most urgent of all when the war stops. It has to consider how to ensure supplies of food and raw materials for the half-starved countries of Europe; how to

restore transport by sea and land; how to enable the wheels of normal industry to be set going again. It is faced also with the situation at home that will follow from the demobilization of the forces and the stoppage of armament production —how to secure the speedy re-employment of several millions of people. Some preparation no doubt can be made, and should be made, for dealing afterwards with those other social and economic questions; specialists will be drawing up their proposals; the Government Departments concerned will be considering their post-war programmes. But definite action on any considerable scale is not possible at the moment, and it would be unreasonable to ask for it.

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Thirdly, within the sphere of social progress and reconstruction in general, lies the special task of the improvement of the physical environment—the bettering of our towns, the preservation of our countryside.

Here again it is an error to think that nothing has been done. The nation has long realized that the industrial towns inherited from the nineteenth century are altogether unworthy. Ugly and grimy, monotonous and mean, usually planless and featureless, often congested and overcrowded, no one could claim that our British manufacturing cities are places of beauty and grace! Their tentacles push along the high-roads into the countryside. Patches of sporadic building here and there spoil great parts of a rural landscape which has possessed, and happily often possesses still, a charm that is unsurpassed. From an ashamed recognition of all this, and a resolve to cure it, has sprung the movement for Town and Country Planning.

Parliament passed the first law to establish some measure of control as long ago as 1909. There have been several more statutes since then. Many Local Authorities have done their best to make effective use of the powers conferred upon them, limited as they have been. Several voluntary bodies have been actively at work—The Garden Cities Association, which has now expanded its aims and adopted the title of Town and Country Planning Association; the Town Planning Institute; the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty; the Council for the Preservation of Rural England, and the Council for Scotland; many local societies with similar objects. Under their stimulus public opinion has become more and more alive to the needs of the case, and better instructed as to the measures for meeting them.

Since the war, the consciousness of the existing defects

having become more acute and the demand for a Better Britain more widespread and more vocal, the pressure of national opinion, exerted through Parliament, has led to definite Government action. Towards the end of 1940 the somewhat humble Office of Works was elevated into a "Ministry of Works and Buildings." An energetic Minister was appointed in Lord Reith. He was charged with the duty, not only of supervising the immense volume of Government building necessitated by the war, but also of preparing the ground for a comprehensive national policy for "the Physical Planning of Town and Country."

After prolonged delay, caused chiefly by inter-departmental controversies, a long step forward has now been announced by the Government in a statement made to Parliament on February 11. The Department is to be expanded again and to change its title once more: it will become the "Ministry of Works and Planning." The Planning powers under the existing statutes have been in the hands of the Ministry of Health; they are now to be transferred to the new Department. A Bill will be introduced at an early date somewhat enlarging those powers, and dealing with certain urgent matters—relating to the reconstruction of areas devastated by enemy action, and with the price of land needed for public purposes. More comprehensive legislation is to follow. Within the Department the control of Government building will be the charge of a special section—important, so long as the war lasts, but secondary to the organization of National Planning.

The fact is recognized that, wide as will be the task of this Ministry, the work of social reconstruction is much wider. Even apart from the questions of education, employment, the status of the workman, and the like, in matters of physical planning themselves the Minister cannot act independently and alone. The future development of the towns must largely depend upon the location of new and expanded industries. The Minister of Planning has not the knowledge to decide upon that. The Board of Trade is concerned there. Strategic considerations may enter also; the War Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry must be consulted. The programme of arterial roads is another important factor; this raises many issues which are within the sphere of the Ministry of Transport and must remain there. Agriculture is directly affected, when the question arises, as it constantly does, of farm lands being taken for building; it is affected also when the cities set out to surround themselves by broad Green Belts of rural land

and villages in order to save themselves from a corpulent growth of continuous building. On those matters the Ministry of Agriculture must be given a voice. Scotland presents special problems. The principle of Scottish self-government requires—and rightly—that National Planning in Scotland must be controlled in Edinburgh by Scotsmen, and not in London by an English Department (even though the head of it may at the moment be himself a Scot). Yet what is done there cannot be unrelated to the course pursued in the southern part of the island.

To meet this situation, the scheme of the Government provides that the Minister of Planning shall be assisted by an Advisory Committee, consisting of senior officials of all the Departments concerned. The business of this Committee will be, in the words of the statement, "to ensure that, as far as possible, the national policy of urban and rural development is carried out as a single and consistent whole." If a difference of opinion arises in this advisory body, the point will be referred to a Committee of Ministers concerned, under Mr. Greenwood's chairmanship. If further need should arise, there may be reference finally to the War Cabinet.

This general lay-out of the Government organization, this "Plan for Planning," is on the lines that have been advocated by the various Associations which have expressed their views, and by most, indeed almost all, of the active leaders of the national movement. It will be accepted, I believe, by public opinion throughout the country as ending the preliminary stage, and as a satisfactory starting-point for the next.

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The reasons why, in spite of thirty years of effort, so little that is effective has been done to remedy the old evils and to stop the growth of new ones, are well known. In the first place there has been no driving force at the centre. The powers, such as they are, have been in the hands of the Ministry of Health, very busy with many other things. And the powers have been almost wholly negative—to watch the Local Authorities; to prevent their over-stepping their permitted functions; to act as a Revising Chamber for all their proposals. In the localities, again, the areas of the Authorities have usually been too small; the ancient boundaries, even with modern revisions, have not given adequate scope for comprehensive schemes. A wide enough area can only be dealt with by voluntary co-operation between two or more neighbouring Councils; and the nearest neighbours are not always the closest friends.

There have been formidable difficulties also, in obtaining control over the land, in spite of more and more drastic powers successively conferred by Acts of Parliament. The provision for assessing compensation for properties that are affected injuriously, and for claiming recoupment from owners that are benefited, are complicated and uncertain; they often involve the Councils in risk of financial burdens greater than many of them can afford to incur. All this, added to the bottle-neck at Whitehall, imposes intolerable delays. It is usually a matter of years before a scheme can be drafted, negotiated, considered and approved. Only a sustained zeal on the part of a Council and its officials can carry it through without a series of compromises and concessions that will rob it of much of its value; and that zeal is not always found. Furthermore, some questions are not local but national; in particular the preservation of large areas of the most beautiful parts of the country as National Parks—the Scottish Highlands, the English Lake District, the Snowdon country, Dartmoor and Exmoor, are the principal areas suggested; the preservation also of the amenities of the coast-line. For this there is no central authority empowered to act, and no fund available.

Now the Ministry of Planning is to be called into being, armed, let us hope, with full powers. One of its first tasks is to be the promotion of a Bill to control the rebuilding of the devastated areas; to prevent also a speculative rise in the price of land needed for re-planning. Other legislation is to follow. It will be necessary to constitute joint authorities in many districts from groups of neighbouring Councils. In order to avoid delays, there should be devolution also from the Ministry in London to local branches set up in the eleven Civil Defence Regions of England and Wales, or areas analogous to them. As soon as the expert Committee appointed early in 1941—the Uthwatt Committee—has finally reported, a far-reaching Bill will be needed, giving extensive powers to the local Planning Authorities to acquire, on just terms—just to the public as well as to the owners—all the land needed for the full execution of their schemes, or to secure adequate control over it. Stronger provisions are needed to prevent ribbon development along the highways; and the control of this matter, now vested, strangely enough, in the Ministry of Transport, should be transferred, to the Ministry of Planning. The building industry needs organization and expansion to enable it to cope with the vast tasks that await it; and

scientific research should be directed, more than hitherto, to the methods and the materials of building. Finally, a National Planning Fund should be put at the disposal of the new Ministry, with powers to create the National Parks and to preserve the coast-line for public use and enjoyment.

Here is a large programme. The preparations must be made well in advance. We cannot leave the matter till the end of the war. Then a vast problem of employment will suddenly arise, through the demobilization of millions of people from the armed forces and the discharge of millions more from munitions. At the same time there will be an insistent pressure for quick building in the destroyed towns; while the arrears of several years of normal building will have to be made good. The Local Authorities, therefore, must be ready with their plans. But they cannot be ready unless Parliament and the Ministry tell them in advance what their duties and their powers are to be. If the matter is left till the end of the war, there will be confusion, delay, a sense of frustration. The nation will be in an angry mood if months go by and millions are left unemployed and on the dole; if the Better Britain is found to have been no more than a phrase, not taken seriously by our governors.

I believe that public opinion will not permit this. But it is only by constant parliamentary pressure during the last two years that we have advanced as far as we have; and there can be no assurance that, if that pressure were relaxed, the further advance that is essential will be achieved.

But if it is, if the larger measures are taken, if provision is made with foresight, if the stores of willing assistance that are waiting throughout the country are fully utilized, then the movement for National Planning will attain its goal, and, with concurrent action in other spheres, even within a single generation, the Better Britain may take substance and form.

BRITAIN AND RUSSIA

By Sir Bernard Pares

OUR alliance with Russia came as a complete surprise to most of our politicians. It owed its genius, of course, to Hitler who knocked the heads of our two peoples together in one obvious common interest; its immediate achievement it owed to a brilliant improvisation of the statesmanship and commonsense of our Prime Minister.

There was nothing really odd about it. Mr. Eden had concluded in 1935 that there were no serious conflicts of interest between us. If we look back further, apart from the Intervention of 1919, we have only once fought Russia, when neither side gained anything by it. On the other hand, we have four times been allied with her—and each time in common defence against a great European aggression—which would suggest that the cause which we were defending together was that of peace.

If it were only a question between the British and Russian peoples, there ought to be no difficulty in the matter. There is no other people that gets on with us so naturally or shares more of our peculiar characteristics, and the points of difference are all matters in which each of us has much to give which the other might well be glad to take. This begins with a common understanding of values and a common instinct of friendship. My own study of Russia was undertaken precisely because of the complete contrast between politicians and press assuring us that Russia was our natural enemy and the practically unanimous report of our traders and others who had actually lived in Russia and assured us of the opposite. That is, so to speak, our secret, and in fact there is definitely a freemasonry between all of us who have lived long there. You will hear the same thing from those of us who have made intimate friendships with Russians in England.

But for the politicians it is a very different story, and many of them have found themselves sadly in need of a new orientation to satisfy the accomplished fact of the alliance. There were two possible dangers to this alliance—both of them

political. Our left-winger might think he saw in it a party triumph. This would be a complete mistake, for if we had paid anything like the necessary attention to what has been happening in Russia in the period of Stalin, we should have seen that no gospel of world revolution was now to be expected of Russia, who had tried it and reverted completely from the international to the national. How was it possible to picture as a demon or angel about to sweep down on us a political experiment which was tried out completely and in its essential features was abandoned as unworkable in Russia as far back as 1917-21? "Communism" is now officially regarded in Russia as an ideal not yet attained, and the principle "to everyone according to his needs," though largely realized in social services, has in all practical matters given way to the ordinary understanding in other countries—"to everyone according to his work." If the left wingers had learnt Russian and made a serious study of the country, they would have added more to our knowledge; but they were far more interested in the theory of the new experiment. The issue of "continuous revolution," was exactly that on which Stalin fought and routed the bitterest of his enemies, Trotsky.

It is inevitable that the pressing of this obsolete view here should provoke a corresponding aberration on our other extreme. If Russia means world revolution on the model of 1917-21, then those on our right must be instinctively afraid of any contact with Russia. But nearly all the authors of that attempt have disappeared in Russia. A single passage in the history of a country, and such a poignant passage as that, is not a thing that can be repeated in the same form—especially if the main part of its work, the removal of a dead government and the equalization of rights and of classes has already been done. Russia is now busy with other and further tasks, above all the satisfaction of all material needs for the whole country, and in such a case, particularly in a world war, it is fatal for us to adhere obstinately to the perspective of twenty years ago.

All this can only be called by its proper name "ignorance," and let us see how it has arisen. In 1914 an aggressive Germany declared war on Russia, we came to her assistance and each side pledged itself not to make peace separately. Russia had no adequate heavy plant and could not make her own munitions. For this reason, as all the military records prove, her army was in substance destroyed three times over. She had to beg of us what we then sorely needed for ourselves, and our contribution only reached her in anything like adequate

volume when her regular army was no longer there to use it. The country was covered with cripples. The Russian government crashed, not primarily because it was autocratic but because it was the most inefficient government of its kind. It was replaced by chaos—by a huge gap. The revolution was far more important to Russia than the war itself. The helm was seized by a small group of internationalists, returned from their work of world revolution abroad. They saw indistinctly the new world order which they wished to create. Peace was a first necessity, and it was their promise of it that more than anything else brought them to power.

Russia slipped out of the picture, especially for the rulers of Russia, and its place was taken by world revolution. To cut their losses and retain a foothold for their new experiment, they sacrificed nearly all the territory gained since Peter the Great. Patriotic Russians challenged this and offered us their swords which we, still in the heat of war, accepted exactly as we accept those of the Free French to-day. Thus there was a civil war in Russia and a half-hearted foreign intervention which really helped the other side. Our partners were beaten and took refuge in western Europe where they remained our most accessible informants on Russia, and they continued to see her as she was at that poignant moment when they left her—that moment of twenty years ago which could not be repeated.

The Soviet Government of that time, irritated and angered, replied with a new intervention—one in its own speciality, that of world revolution. For three years there was practically no contact between the two countries, and the mutual boycott became for both sides almost an instinct and a habit. The Soviet censorship defeated even the most enterprising of foreign correspondents and they returned in despair and vexation: their editors saw little use in such a thin stream of sterilized news. We were left planted with the views of twenty years ago.

Meanwhile Russia was changing faster than any country in Europe. The young giant was rapidly outgrowing the measles of its childhood. From the humiliation of Brest-Litovsk let us trace this great revival, so triumphant to-day in the magnificent defence of one's own country.

For several years after the economic collapse of the wholesale communist experiment, the leaders held on obstinately in their hope of a general world revolution, in the ironical position of a government that had been radically defeated in

its original purposes at home. This was not illogical. The world revolution might come after all in one of those industrial countries for which it had been originally intended, among which agricultural Russia was not one of those primarily envisaged. But the passionate moment of 1917 had passed, and this hope received the almost annihilating answer of the peaceful failure of the General Strike in our own country in 1926.

This led straight to a new epoch in Russia. Furious disagreements broke out in the Communist Party which really ruled the country. On the one side were Trotsky and the Old Bolsheviks, trained abroad in a school of international conspiracy, with their doctrine of "continuous revolution." On the other were Stalin and the new generation in Russia, who alike had hardly ever been out of the country and had been cut off from Europe by the years of mutual boycott. Stalin had the enormous tactical advantage of being the General Secretary of the ruling Party, but he was engaged in slowly making Party and country identical. Slowly but surely, Stalin won outright. His triumph was absolute by 1928—thirteen years ago.

Now was the time for editors with vision to seek renewed contact with Russia, but the chance was not taken, and for the next few years Soviet suspicions made it difficult to take it. Stalin had formulated his new mottoes: "Socialism in one country," which means construction at home instead of international conspiracy abroad; "revolution is not for export"; "working relations with any foreign government, even capitalist which is friendly to the Soviet Union,"—that is, to Russia. But so far he was engaged in carrying through his new policy of construction against undoubted opposition and even "wrecking." Trotsky had certainly left behind him a network of conspiracy. No one will suggest that every victim of Soviet "purges" and "wreckers' trials" was guilty, and many innocent persons were swept into the net. But Stalin was indeed dealing with a real "Fifth Column." If he had not crushed it, he would have been defeated in a programme which had almost for its first object the rearming of the country and the rectification of that weakness which had led to the annihilation of the Russian army in the last war.

It was fortunate for Stalin that by ruthless severity, later varied by stimulation and encouragement, he was able to win through with his new construction just in time to face the national and international menace of Hitler's advent to power

in Germany. Not only in *Mein Kampf* but up to 1939 Hitler definitely aimed at the conquest of Russia which he is now attempting. "When we are talking of more ground and room in Europe we can in the first place only think of Russia" (*Mein Kampf* II. 742-3). "That Jewish sponge fungus" (Speech at Wilhelmshaven, April 11, 1939). Meanwhile, on Russia's eastern frontier, from 1927 onwards, had sprung up another national menace in the new policy of unlimited aggression in Japan, the future ally of Germany.

Stalin will go down to history as a patriot with a policy of socialist construction, but the foresight with which he dealt with the new danger puts him in the highest rank of contemporary statesmen. Both on his home and foreign fronts he dealt with it at once surely and resolutely. On the home front he sought immediately a synthesis between the new principles which he aimed to establish and the national instincts which he had to satisfy. This synthesis he achieved, in his broad revision of his programme of collective farming, his recognition of local initiative, his concessions to the instinct of property (especially in livestock), his encouragement of personal enterprise in industry, his re-establishment of the family, parental authority and the discipline of children, his "de-bunking" of undigested propaganda in the national system of education. All these drastic changes in the legislation of 1935-6 were published at the time in English, but practically obtained no recognition. We continued to talk of Russia in terms of 1917-21.

It was this special ignorance on our side that prevented our recognition of Stalin's new foreign policy. It was of a piece with his new home policy. To safeguard his new construction in Russia, he had absolute need of world peace. He therefore sought the co-operation of the democracies to prevent a new war by establishing a common front against aggression from Germany and Japan. Without delay he obtained the long missing recognition of the Soviet régime in America, brought Russia into the League of Nations, made a Pact and then an Alliance with France and also with Czechoslovakia, and sent Maisky to London to win the friendship of England. At Geneva Litvinov called insistently for firmness against aggression in Abyssinia, in Spain, in Czechoslovakia. In eastern Europe, Russia, with her instinct of nationality more virile than ever, remembered her losses of 1919 and her absence from the peace settlement, and called before everything for the

recognition of her return to her former rank as one of the world powers.

This was the new Russia, the Russia of the Russian people:—with its special care for the poor, the infirm, the crippled, the old and the young, and its long deferred emancipation of women; with its freedom of medical attendance for all, with its new modern state system of education on a basis of freedom, with its almost unique achievement of all-round literacy; with its equalization of all the 180 odd nationalities of the State in rights and duties; with its Red army united in "the defence of the Soviet homeland," at last adequately equipped and supplied, where the man behind the rifle, educated and alert, now regarded himself as a part-owner in the homeland for which he was ready to fight. This synthesis re-established the links with the past. The national past is now honoured in Russia; so are the great glories of Russian art and music; but it is a new Russia far stronger than ever before, full of virility and vigour.

In the light of this new discovery which has now been brought home to us in the stern school of battle, let us look back on some of our own doubts and hesitations. It is not difficult to trace some of their sources. To certain elements in the Russian emigration, in no way representative of the mass of it, but not without influence in their social connections, we can trace the now exploded theory that the Russian Army and especially the Russian General Staff, without their former leaders, would offer Hitler an easy walk-over, and that at the first reverses the country would rise against its new régime, Sir Stafford Cripps has declared that Stalin is now far stronger than at the beginning of the war.

Catholics are still justly incensed at the religious trials and sentences of Easter, 1923, which the Polish Catholic priests faced with such undaunted courage, and the Catholic cause always tends to blend with that of Poland. Indeed, in those provinces which have changed hands between Russia and Poland, peasants would even describe themselves to me rather as Catholic or Orthodox than as Poles or Russians. Poland after her long and brutal oppression by Tzarist Russia was able to make hay when the international aberration of 1917-21 had paralysed the national defence in Russia, and something like 14 million Russians then passed under Polish rule. This territory was recovered by the Soviet Government when the Polish army was defeated by Hitler, and otherwise it could only have passed to him. Clearly here are questions calling

for a careful settlement, and Mr. Eden has wisely lent his help in them. Fortunately there is a precedent for the British view on the question in the frontier line recommended to both parties by Lord Curzon in 1920.

Another obstacle to understanding is the attitude of those few English leftists who have not in the slightest realized that Trotsky and Stalin were deadly enemies and political opposites and sometimes talk as if they still want a world revolution on the old exploded lines.

At least equally dangerous are those political theorists among ourselves who have failed to understand that the commanding position of Britain in Eastern Europe, when both Germany and Russia were out of the picture, could only be temporary. On this basis sprang up a school of thought which set itself to reshape the frontiers of Eastern nationalities and to bring them all together under British leadership. If this has led at least to a better knowledge of that part of Europe and to a keener interest in it and therefore in the natural rights of the smaller nationalities, we can only be glad. But on this basis, with the temporary exclusion of Russia and Germany, was founded a hope of uniting all these little powers into something like a big power which would serve as a barrier to aggression. Events have shown in the most striking way that this hope is a delusion. They must have some real force behind them. No one can blame the rulers of the little states if each did everything to avoid invasion of his own country. And had we sufficiently studied their own jealousies and rivalries? As in the time of Napoleon, who also sought the conquest of Europe as an indirect way of breaking down the power of Britain, no solid resistance to the aggression of Hitler presented itself until he invaded Russia. This time, even France went down in the general crash.

We have no adequate equipment to undertake such a task alone. The weakest link in all our national armoury is our intelligence, and our ignorance of Eastern Europe and most especially of Russia is still almost abysmal. As to military power, we could not, for instance, send to Poland either a battleship or an army corps; least of all could we maintain a permanent army there to uphold British authority. The main lesson of this war is that a real peace has to rely on real strength. We can only rejoice that smaller states in their recognition of this lesson, are now wisely drawing together for mutual defence, but there can be no durable peace in Europe

without a real and solid understanding between Britain and Russia.

The same generation in Europe has twice had to suffer the horrors of a world war, and the lesson has to be read in the light of the countless sufferings and of the countless sacrifices of two generations. No prejudices of the past, least of all if they are based on misunderstandings, must be allowed to stand in the way of a firm and stable settlement. The people who defended Britain in 1940 have a right to demand this, and are sure to do so.

THE BALANCE IN THE FAR EAST

By Hugh Quigley

THE position in the Far East, as the result of the complete Japanese occupation of Malaya and their penetration towards Rangoon, has become more sharply defined, and it is possible to give a tentative definition of the balance of forces in that area. It is quite possible that some unforeseen circumstance may intervene even now to upset calculations, but Japanese strategy would appear to be just as firmly conceived as it is brilliantly executed.

One must be clear about the essentials, particularly the weaknesses of the British and American policy. It is difficult to apportion the blame for what has happened since the American plan of appeasement *à outrance* has transcended even that of Chamberlain at Munich with rather less justification, and the dismissal of a general and an admiral for dereliction of duty does not serve to cover up or excuse a worse dereliction of duty on the part of the American State Department. On the other hand, the sheer inability of Great Britain to understand the position in the Far East and the extraordinary weakness of our intelligence, particularly in Japan, led the public to expect that sufficient provision had been made, not merely to garrison the outlying naval and air bases adequately, but to ensure a constant and adequate stream of reinforcements in the event of an attack taking place. After all, it must have taken the Japanese forces not less than three weeks to get from Japan to Malaya, and yet there has been no indication either that the American or British were aware of the departure of Japanese convoys, or, if they were aware, that they understood the Japanese purpose. Singapore has played in the Far East almost exactly the same rôle as the Maginot Line in France, and the tactics adopted to reduce it bear a curious resemblance to those adopted by the Germans. They took it from the rear without any difficulty whatever.

Now, if there had been no Singapore, or if there had been a real understanding of the vulnerability of Singapore, the Allied strategy in the Far East would have been different, and while

the Japanese successes might have taken place just the same, they might have been delayed over a longer period of time. Quite apart from ignorance of the Japanese intentions and of the principles of modern strategy, the Allies had not really studied the economic strength of Japan, and in Japan I include Korea, Manchuria and Northern China. There is no reason why Great Britain and America should not have understood this, because British and American industrialists have made a very large contribution indeed to the industrialization of Manchuria, and even at the beginning of the war there were large orders in industrial establishments in this country being carried out on Japanese account.

The economic strength of Japan, including the Asiatic mainland, is certainly no less than that of Great Britain, and what is more important, is very much greater than that of the Eastern half of Russia and the Western half of the United States. Even if the whole of Great Britain's economic strength had been concentrated in the Pacific, it is doubtful whether Great Britain could, single handed, have resisted an attack by Japan. If, however, the real position is that an infinitesimal proportion of the fighting strength of Great Britain can be allocated to the Far East, the Eastern half of Russia remains neutral and the Western half of the United States is so completely unprepared as to be open to easy invasion from Japan, then of course the position of the Allies is impossible right at the beginning. To inform the British public that the Japanese attack could be easily countered by Great Britain and the United States was a criminal distortion of fact, for which those responsible should be called to account.

It is important to make a deliberate exception in the case of Australia and New Zealand, because it is already quite clear that the Australians had an acute appreciation of the situation. They repeatedly drew the attention of the British Government, long before the Japanese attack, to the extremely critical position in the Far East. They proposed certain measures which were not carried out, and even after the onset of Japanese attack the supply of reinforcements from Great Britain and from India was inadequate, and in any case the necessity to use the long Cape route in order to get reinforcements out to the Far East delayed them to a point where they could not arrive in time to affect the issues. In the race for time, the Japanese have hitherto won easily, but if the advice of Australia and New Zealand had been taken, this race might have ended otherwise. It is this very circumstance which

imposes on Australia and New Zealand a reconsideration of their economic and political position.

So far the war has shown—

(1) The economic strength of Great Britain is barely sufficient to deal with developments in the Western theatre of the war, and the Libyan adventure is a fairly good indication of it.

(2) The capacity of the United States to exercise any real influence on this course of events within an appreciable time is very severely limited. Even if the State Department had not been guilty of major errors of policy and had been entirely aware of the Japanese programme, American reinforcements could not have gone to the Far East in sufficient volume to decide the issue because there was not enough man power enrolled in the American fighting services.

(3) The only salvation for Australia, apart from Australia itself, lies in the terrific concentration of industrial production in India combined with the reasonably well trained military forces of China and the highly equipped and highly organized Eastern Army of Russia.

(4) Events in the Mediterranean and elsewhere have shown that there are very real limits to British sea power, and that even if Britain and America between them had control of sea power in the Far East, they could not prevent the persistent and long drawn out Japanese attack on British, American, Dutch and Australian possessions. This war has shown that the strategical value of sea power has shrunk.

The only value that Allied resistance at the present time in the Far East may have had has been the diversion of Japanese forces away from Russia into the South-Western Pacific, and this diversion has probably given the Russian generals time in the West to force the Germans out of the tactically important sections of Russia and ensured the creation of a strongly held defence line for the German attack in the spring. It is doubtful of course whether Japan might have been successful in a direct attack on the Russian Far Eastern army, prior to its campaign against the Allies, but its action in beginning with the Allies has rather weakened its capacity to win a decisive campaign against either the Chinese or the Russians.

What is the significance of those developments for Australia and New Zealand? I believe it to be roughly this. The position must be contemplated where the Japanese will occupy the whole of the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Southern Burma, and even a part of India. At the moment it is not essential for Japanese economic plans that Australia and New Zealand, or for that matter New Guinea or the Philippines should be occupied.

The Japanese campaign can be seen in three stages. The first stage lies in the occupation of Indo-China, Siam, Burma and the contiguous part of India as well as the Dutch East Indies west of New Guinea. This part of the campaign may be completed at longest within the next three or four months. The second stage lies in the reduction of the Philippines, the occupation of the inhabited and inhabitable parts of New Guinea, Australia and New Zealand, and this second phase is probably the most important of the three, because the Japanese are fully aware of the resources of those areas and of the fact that they are capable of supporting an immensely increased population. This is not the case in the areas represented by the first phase of the campaign. The third phase lies in the direct attack on Russia or an attempted invasion of the West Coast of America, not with a view to occupying either Russia or America permanently, but with a view to drawing off Russian and American forces from Australia and New Zealand.

The question may be asked—has Japan got sufficient man power to carry out this policy? The safe assumption is that she has. Any other assumption would be criminal folly. In order to carry out all phases of the campaign the Japanese would count on badly co-ordinated, badly organized and inadequate Allied resistance. She will have little reason to fear attack from Great Britain and the United States if all their air and sea bases in the South-Western Pacific are lost, and her position is not affected adversely by the continuous American occupation of part of the Philippines.

What then can the Australian and New Zealand Governments do? They can of course bow to the logic of events and make their peace with Japan, but it is no more feasible to make permanent peace with the rulers of Japan than it would be to make peace with Hitler. They can attempt to create a South-Western Pacific *bloc* which may in time serve to neutralize Japanese policy, and the first assumption in the formation of such a *bloc* must be that direct assistance from Great Britain and the United States will not, and cannot be available. This means that Australia and New Zealand have got to act as independent states fighting for their independent existence, and, in conjunction with China and Russia and what is left of the Dutch East Indies, work out an economic and political strategy which will ensure their continued existence as independent states. I have deliberately omitted consideration of the military strategy, because this must be determined by economic and political factors.

Australia and New Zealand, with Russia, China and the Dutch East Indies, must form a Pacific Executive Council which will take control over all resources available in that area, determine their effective use and work out the essentials of some plan of resistance to the Japanese campaign. Once that strategy has been evolved, it will be possible for this Pacific Council to insist that Great Britain and the United States should supply it with materials of war. The type of Pacific Council at present proposed, which is composed almost entirely of British and American representatives, with a small sprinkling of other countries, with centres of deliberation in Washington and London, is not the kind of Council which will be of the slightest use in the Far East, and if the Australian Government, or any other Government in the Far East, allows itself to believe that the solution of its troubles is to be found in such a Council, it has already lost the war in the Far East. The war must be confined, both in strategy and in fact, to the South-Western Pacific. At most such a Council can count on a respite of three or four months, since it will take Japan that period to round off the first phase of her operations, and during that period it must not only organize its forces capable of resistance, but also direct and control the flow of reinforcements from the United States and Great Britain. There is absolutely no time available for any further discussion of priorities or preferences or relative bargaining positions. The whole future of the British Empire is involved in the continued independence of Australia and New Zealand, but the preservation of that independence is no longer a matter for Great Britain or the combined British Empire, but for Australia and New Zealand alone. It will be difficult to prevent the Japanese from carrying out the second phase of their operations, and it will be impossible to prevent their ultimate success if the combined Russian, Chinese and Australian strategy is not worked out at once. The assumption must be made that the part played by Great Britain and the United States will be confined merely to the supply of munitions of war.

Assuming that the war either ends in a prolonged stalemate, which would be tantamount to Japanese defeat, or in a Japanese defeat, then there must be some consideration of the long term consequences of the change in the balance of Pacific powers. It is quite clear that the two dominant powers in the Far East, must be China and some form of Australian-New Zealand federation. This means that Australia must develop its economic resources to the absolute maximum, it must

accelerate the process of industrialization, and it must increase its population to several times the existing figure if it is to survive a second Far Eastern war. It has been shown since 1918 that it is impossible to keep down permanently any single great power such as Germany or Japan, and this means either that Japan should be brought into a full economic and political alliance with the other Pacific powers, or it should be neutralized by the increasing strength of the British and American section of those powers. Australia, with a highly organized population of thirty million is a different proposition for Japan from a semi-developed, largely disorganized country with a population of only seven million.

It is difficult in advance to work out the economic consequences of such a change. The intensive industrialization of Australia and the opening up of the Chinese market must mean a change in the agricultural configuration of the country. The part played by its exports of foodstuffs in determining its balance of trade will result in its becoming almost entirely independent of Great Britain and the United States. The war has shown that there are no serious difficulties in the provision of capital for development, if the country under development is in control of its own resources, and has not handed them over to private enterprise from other countries, and it follows that the political configuration of the country will also change, very possibly in the direction of more complete Government control of natural resources and the means by which such resources are converted into immediately available wealth.

Those considerations may not appear to have any importance at the present time, but they do determine in advance the strength and the direction of the resistance put up by Australia and New Zealand to the Japanese attack. Quite apart from the question of self-preservation, it will be difficult to keep the population of Australia, particularly, firm in its determination over a long period of time, if it believes that a return to the position ruling before the war will take place. If it is convinced that the outcome of this war will be a greater and more powerful Australia, in control of its own destiny and one of the most powerful constructive forces in the South-Western Pacific and in the world, then its opposition to Japan will increase instead of diminishing and its ultimate success will be all the more certain.

GERMANY IN SPAIN

By Spectator

GERMANY has long been interested in Spain, where her nationals have not been without influence in business circles; she is now demanding adequate recompense for services rendered to General Franco in the Civil War, and she insists that it must be made in political, and not only economic, coin. German intrigue in Spain is no new thing. During the last war her instruments were the 70,000 Germans and Austrians then in Spain, many of them from South America.

After the Great War, German interest in Spanish affairs decreased, and it was not until Hitler came to power in 1933 that it again became noticeable. Spain then became an early victim of the conception held by the *Reich* General Staff that foreign policy is always a struggle for possession of the best strategical positions. A state that cannot secure these positions for itself must win over suitable allies whose bases will be available for use. To Germany, then, the territory of Spain provides a whole series of naval and air bases of incalculable value in time of war.

Against this background it is not surprising that, from 1933 onwards, Germany spared no expense in the organization of a German Fifth Column in Spain. Before long the *Reich* was maintaining no fewer than 25 separate organizations in that country, the chief of them consisting of the foreign one of the National Socialist Party and the Spanish section of the German Labour Front, which extended over a network of more than 50 centres. Each of these organizations had at its disposal a special agent of the Gestapo and spies in the chief business and banking concerns.

German diplomatic and consular representatives in Spain were flooded with propaganda from Germany, chiefly from the *Fichte Bund* organization in Hamburg. In 1933 Dr. Goebbels had issued instructions that all German tourist offices abroad were to be used as propaganda centres, and thus, in Madrid, Herr Gustav Reder, Nazi Press Director and press consultant

to the German Embassy in Spain, became Propaganda Chief to the local *Reich* Railways agency. Herr Reder tampered ceaselessly with the freedom of the Spanish press, and soon reported that, in the month of September, 1933, alone the Spanish newspapers published 145 articles favourable to the Hitler régime. On the radio, propaganda talks on National Socialism encouraged listeners to begin a correspondence course which assisted the Germans to build up a valuable card index of "sympathizers"; political films disguised as "cultural," books and pamphlets, were all distributed by Herr Reder's office on a large scale.

Propaganda activities alone, however, did not satisfy the German Government. Germany had for many years occupied second place in Spain's foreign trade, and since 1931 had taken first place among the countries selling goods to her. The amount of German capital invested in Spain, although not large, was spread over important sections of the national economy, particularly iron-ore and the electrical and chemical industries. There were thus in Spain many German merchants, technicians and engineers well acquainted with the Spanish market.

These circumstances were at once seized upon by Berlin as a suitable background for a widespread system of espionage. In Spain, as in other countries, this system was organized under cover of the title "Harbour Service." There was hardly a German merchant, firm, or enterprise in Spain that had not something to do with shipping, and a German organization connected with shipping could not, therefore, have raised any objections from the Spanish authorities. In fact, the so-called Harbour Service was under the control of Herr Kurt Wremke, whose Berlin office became the headquarters of the Gestapo organization in Spain. Included in the ranks of the "Harbour Service" were employees of such firms as *Lufthansa* air services, and the Siemens electrical works.

Through the organization of the Harbour Service large scale efforts were made to capture Spanish trade. Most of the chief Nazi leaders in Spain were employed in local German firms, and this fact enabled the German Foreign Trade Office to build up detailed information useful for political as well as for economic purposes. As far back as July, 1935, for example, the Foreign Trade Office boasted in its secret information bulletin that it had nearly 3,500 firms registered on its card index.

This economic penetration was greatly facilitated by the

fact that before the Civil War the Spanish chemical industry and trade was wholly in the hands of the German Dye Trust, from a local branch of which the Catalonian textile industry was bound to procure all its chemicals and dyestuffs. Spain's pharmaceutical industry was in the hands of Schering-Kaulbaum, her industrial gas tied to the Gass Ververtungs-A.G., her electrical industry controlled by Siemens, her aviation in the hands of Heinkel, Junkers and the *Lufthansa*. With the exception of the British Rio Tinto mines, the Spanish mining industry was dominated by the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, and its equipment was bought from Orenstein and Krupp. In most of these cases the firms' titles were Spanish, as were their directors and shareholders. But their civil engineers, their managers, and the patents on which they depended for their operation were German.

Other German espionage organizations in Spain were masked in such disguises as the Academic Exchange Service (*Akademischer Austauschdienst*) which, under cover of scientific exchanges, conducted industrial espionage. Military espionage was undertaken by a firm known as *Windkräfte Centrale* (Aircraft Centre) which had branches and representatives all over the country. The Madrid offices of Siemens were used as a centre for the collection of aerial photographs later found very useful by the Germans during the Civil War.

Until 1936 all these German activities were under the control of the Hamburg Political Police. In that year, however, the Gestapo itself assumed the direction of all Nazi political and economic penetration in Spain. The subsequent power of the Gestapo in Spain was well reflected in the revelation by a special correspondent of the Paris newspaper *L'Ordre* in June, 1938, that the police official from whom he received his safe conduct to travel in Northern Spain knew no word of Spanish. Writing in *L'Europe Nouvelle* of August 27 of the same year, Senor Manuel Chaves Nogales, a Conservative Spanish journalist, said:

> If one observes closely the 'real power' in Spain . . . . what strikes one chiefly is the German influence and the undeniable activity of the Gestapo. From this point of view Spain can already be regarded as a German colony.

Although, by the outbreak of the Civil War, Spain was already honeycombed by German penetration, General Franco doubtless accepted German aid in the hope that it would be disinterested, that once a strong and stable government had been set up in Spain, the Germans would at once withdraw,

leaving the Spaniards to work out their own destiny. Yet, like many others who have trusted in the Third *Reich*, General Franco has found himself betrayed. He has realized that Hitler's words on February 10, 1933, that: "The first and most important item in my Government's programme is that we will not lie and that there shall be no deception," was the measure, not of Germany's honesty, but of the depth of her cunning.

Nor was it strategic naval and military bases in Spain that Germany alone coveted. The *Reich* needed Spain as an industrial unit, with all her economic resources of quicksilver, copper, and iron-ore. She intended that Spain should be not an independent country, but merely an economic appendage of the Axis.

In September, 1938, the German periodical *Wissen und Wehr* published an article by Dr. Hermann Gackenholz which stated:

> Mussolini has put Spain's new National Government under an obligation to him by his active support in the Civil War.

The implication was that Germany, too, had some claim on Spain for the aid she had rendered. Nor had she been slow in taking advantage of her position in Spain. As early as 1937 she was indulging in almost complete sequestration of raw materials in that country, quite oblivious of the needs of the local population. The Nazis divided that part of the country held by General Franco into sectors, and extracted all available commodities from each on the pretext that they were in payment for military aid.

No sooner was the Spanish war over than Germany sent an economic mission to Spain, led by Dr. Wohlthat, Field-Marshal Goering's chief economic adviser. The alleged purpose of this mission was to examine the possibilities of closer commercial relations between Spain and Germany. During the Civil War, General Franco had been unwilling to enter into close economic relations with the *Reich* for fear of causing Britain and France to abandon that policy of non-intervention so advantageous to his cause. Now Spain, withdrawn from world markets and striving for self-sufficiency, had closer economic relations with those nations whose systems were already adapted to trade on a basis of compensation.

The *Reich* was quick to take advantage of this change in Spain's economic outlook. The Nazis had always coveted, for the making of arms, the many raw materials that Spain could provide. One of the most important of these is wolfram, a commodity necessary in the process of hardening steel; both

Germany and Italy, having between them less than 10 per cent. of the amount needed for their war industries, wish to utilize Spanish supplies. No less attractive to Berlin is Spanish mercury. The mercury mines of Almaden account for 51 per cent. of the entire world supply. Figures published in the *Deutsche Volkswirt* in January, 1939, had already shown how German trade with Spain had expanded in the previous year. Increases in imports by Germany of raw materials from Spain were 700,000 tons of iron ore, 19,000 tons of copper ore, and 13,000 tons of zinc. Imports of oranges and olive oil, being unnecessary for the manufacture of armaments, show an equally significant decrease.

Such prospects were too favourable for Dr. Wohlthat to ignore. His mission at once evolved a plan for the more intensive exchange of Spanish raw materials for German manufactured goods. The agreement embodying this arrangement also provided for an increase in the activities of the German trading concern known as H.I.S.M.A., by the grant of mining concessions and commercial facilities to German firms in Spain, this despite the fact that a decree issued by General Franco in 1938 provided that at least 60 per cent. of the capital and shareholding of any new enterprise to exploit minerals in Spain must be Spanish-owned.

That this intensified German economic interest in Spain had an ulterior purpose quickly became evident. Herr Wohlthat proposed that Germany should be entirely responsible for the economic reconstruction of Spain. Spanish industry was to be rebuilt with nothing but German help, as were her railways and roads; following the publication by General Franco of a decree authorizing a new road system in Spain, Professor Speer, the Führer's architectural adviser, and the late Dr. Fritz Todt, builder of Germany's motor roads, and of the Siegfried Line, arranged to visit Spain. The inclusion in Herr Wohlthat's mission of several of the best-known Nazi constructional experts made it clear that Germany intended to get the major share in the large orders connected with the reconstruction of buildings in Spain.

These German economic activities have been followed by equally intensive political penetration, for Berlin has ignored no stratagem in her efforts to entice Spain into the war. German propaganda in Madrid is carefully organized. A big shop window has been rented by the Nazis and filled with maps, diagrams and photographs showing what steps have been taken by German industry to beat the blockade; they are

arranged so that even a child could understand them, and they attract crowds all day long. The only shops doing good trade in Madrid are German-owned, while the German Embassy has a staff of no less than 220. In the whole of Spain there are at least 80,000 Germans, 2,500 of them in Madrid, for whose presence there is no plausible explanation.

The Germans are more vigorous in their propaganda than the Italians. They bribe journalists, subsidize newspapers and publish periodicals advocating the introduction of National Socialist doctrines to Spain. The German press attaché in Madrid, Herr Lazard, boasts not merely that he has bought the Spanish press, but how little it cost him. In Barcelona, Spanish Nationalist war orphans were recently offered 20 free scholarships at the German School. It is hardly surprising that a French officer attached to General Franco's staff referring to Spain, stated to the Paris newspaper *Epoque* as long ago as 1939 that:

> The Germans hold everything. They have the power stations and the telephone exchanges. The whole of the chemical industry is theirs.

The military purpose of German penetration in Spain is equally plain. The Germans have unobtrusively spread their organization and teaching to the army, in which almost all the junior and many of the senior officers are pro-Nazi. As long ago as 1937 German officers were teaching Spanish officers and men modern artillery and gas technique. They also founded a general instruction camp for the Spanish military where, by June, 1939, some 50,000 Spaniards had already taken courses. To-day the entire organizational work and training of the Spanish army is in the hands of German officers, German experts and German armament factories. German officers supervise the Spanish military technical schools and the technical corps of the army. The effect of this German control was seen on April 29, 1940, when General Fuentes Cervera, Spanish Under Secretary for War, in a lecture he gave in Madrid, went so far as to apply to Spain the geopolitical doctrines of Professor Karl Haushofer, which are the inspiration of the German General Staff.

In aerial matters Germany is equally well-established. In Southern Spain German engineers are constructing aerodromes—at Huelva and Cadiz, for example. Here and elsewhere in Spain, airfields have their full complement of German ground staff and supplies, and numbers of German aircraft are stored in their hangars. In the starving and immobilized Spanish countryside big German dumps of food and petrol

have been placed at strategic points. Spain is also to manufacture bombing aircraft under the supervision of German technicians. Not least, Spanish air lines, and especially those to Morocco and the Canary Islands, are under the control of the *Lufthansa*. It was not for nothing that even before the Spanish war the Germans, to ensure that only German machines should be chosen for service in Spain, sabotaged machines sent to Spain for tests by the United States and other countries.

The Spanish Navy, consisting of six cruisers, 19 destroyers, 24 torpedo boats, minelayers and gunboats, would be a useful addition to the German navy, which has not neglected to annex even Denmark's few small destroyers. On the outbreak of war, 200,000 tons of German shipping sought shelter in Spanish ports, there being 30 Nazi vessels anchored in Vigo Bay alone. Once armed, these ships would provide Germany with a formidable force of sea-raiders.

In June, 1938, the late General von Reichenau, one of the most pro-Nazi of the German military leaders, gave a private lecture to a gathering of *Reich* military and party leaders in which he said:

> The conflict in Spain vitally affects the German people. That is the consideration which moved us in giving our moral and material assistance to Nationalist Spain . . . Germany has not become weaker through her intervention in Spain, but on the contrary, stronger, and her prospects have been bettered. Her military successes are of special importance, for they hold so many lessons of a decisive character that we may well speak of the Spanish War as of a Staff College. . . . The Spanish war experience of our picked dive bombers is a great asset to our reborn army. . . . The Spanish war has not only been a splendid school for war, but also a piece of excellent policy. For systematic and careful war preparation it is necessary to devise means long beforehand whereby one may get at the enemy, his commercial routes, his sea routes, his means of transport, his fixed and movable *potential de guerre*. . . . A state like ours, not being in a position to acquire the necessary *points d'appui* by direct action, must fill up the gap thanks to its alliances.

That admission of Germany's real objectives in Spain cannot be dismissed merely as the hypothetical application to Spain of German military theses by the Nazi student of war. Germany fully intends to utilize Spain in her plans of conquest no less in the New World than the Old.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIES

By Norman Bentwich

IN September, 1938, the month of Berchtesgaden, of Godesberg and Munich, the second British Commonwealth Relations Conference gathered at Sydney to discuss the common policy and the mutual relations of the British peoples. The first Conference had been held five years before in Canada, and there a sure common basis of policy had been found in the support of collective security through the League of Nations. The position in 1938 seemed much more obscure and confused. Great Britain had not stood steadfastly by the League in resisting the aggressor states, and the representatives of several of the Dominions were critical of her attitude. Lord Lothian was the chairman of the British delegation, which included Mr. Ernest Bevin, then just a Trade Union leader and not yet a Member of Parliament; and also Mr. Lionel Curtis, who was the father of the Institutes of International Relations. Delegations came from all the self-governing Dominions, including Ireland, and from India, which was regarded by anticipation as a member of the Commonwealth. While the delegates spoke with many voices, and the spirit of the Conference was summarized by Mr. Bevin at the concluding meeting as "on the other hand," there was one point of general agreement: The Commonwealth could not have a sufficient ideal and inspiration in preserving itself. It must find some larger purpose in a function to humanity. It could not be isolated from the rest of the world, but must help to lay the foundation for international peace and a better order for all. It owed a duty to mankind, to help in securing decent standards of life for everybody. The Commonwealth and Empire together embraced nearly one quarter of the world's surface and one quarter of the world's population. It was the greatest aggregation of peoples under a single rule, linked up with every continent, every race, every creed. Together with the other English-speaking peoples in the United States of America, it comprised one-third of the human race. In a new order it must take a pre-eminent position.

The Sydney Conference naturally devoted great attention to the question of the constitutional and economic links between the different parts of the Commonwealth. Again great divergence of opinion was manifested in the attitude of the different members of the Commonwealth. Australia, and less emphatically New Zealand, desired close union with Great Britain and regular consultation on matters of foreign policy and defence. The Canadian representatives, on the other hand, stood out for independence; and at that time, before the shadow of Munich had fallen, claimed that the Dominions must be independent in foreign policy and in questions of peace and war. Canada, no less than Australia, was a Pacific Power, but she felt herself linked as closely with the United States as with Great Britain. South Africa, for different reasons, claimed independence in foreign policy and defence. The same divergence of opinion has shown itself during the war in regard to the question of an Imperial War Cabinet. The Dominions in the Far East, though furthest from Great Britain, have pressed for such a Cabinet. Canada and South Africa have not felt the need.

The second world war has pointed still more emphatically than the first the significance of a world outlook on the part of the British peoples and, indeed, of the English-speaking peoples; and it has emphasized also the need for more thorough arrangements for common defence. The inner understanding between the British peoples may be so complete that the idea of Imperial federation, with a regular constitutional machinery of legislature, executive and judiciary, may be rejected. The bonds are stronger because they are less visible. On the other hand the forcible teaching of the war does indicate that some more definite union between the British peoples will be required in a new order. Mr. Lionel Curtis has recently set out in his pamphlet *Action* the minimum requirements of a defence union. While independent nationhood was the dominant outcome of the first World War in the feeling of the Dominions, international responsibility is likely to be the outcome of the second world war. The Commonwealth, if it is to hold, must be a dynamic growing body. And we must expect that after this war it will include self-governing Dominions not only of white men: besides the dominion of India, within a measurable future a Dominion of the peoples of East and West Africa. The Commonwealth will grow as the Empire diminishes. Two fundamental changes, indeed, will be required in the mind of the British

nations if they are to carry out within the Commonwealth the principles of the Atlantic Charter: to secure to all men the four freedoms. One is an external, the other an internal change. The internal change concerns the relations of the British peoples to the Indian, the African and other coloured peoples. The champions of a single humanity, must throw aside the colour prejudices and the colour barriers that, at present, stand in the way of equal treatment. The exclusion of British subjects from India and Africa in the British Dominions is a constant challenge to the principles which we proclaim.

The external change concerns the relation of the nations of the Commonwealth to outside peoples as regards economic policy and immigration. Canada and Australia are amongst the least populated parts of the world's surface. The policy of autarky in immigration, which has been maintained during the last generation, can hardly be squared with the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The Dominions cannot fairly hope to reserve their territory for British peoples. They should make their contribution in providing a home for some part of the population of Europe that, after this war of devastation, will seek a home overseas; and they may be willing to open their doors also to some regulated immigration of the teeming peoples of the East. The Northern tropical regions of Australia, particularly, cannot be filled by white settlers; their defence to-day would be better assured if they were inhabited by loyal people from the Empire. There is no greater contrast as regards density of population than that between the Australian continent and the nearest islands of the Dutch Indies. In the continent the ratio of population is two persons to the square mile, while in Java it is nearly 1,000 to the square mile. The contrast with the United States, which has about the same area, is almost equally glaring: in one country 140 millions, in the other 7 millions.

The countries of the British Commonwealth, also have a big part to play in raising the standard of life throughout the world. Australia and New Zealand have attained a higher level of social and economic well-being than any other country, greater than that even of the United States. That is a signal achievement. In an order of which the guiding purpose is that the good things of the earth should be shared by all, economic policy everywhere must be framed in such a way as to secure a fairer distribution of the world's products. And the Dominions will be in a more independent position than at

the outset of the war, because they have already paid off the greater part of their former debt to the mother country. They will, therefore, be free to export their surplus produce to all countries, with the broad aim of sharing with other peoples the benefit of the kind of life which they have been fortunate to develop for their citizens during the past century. To make the world safe for democracy, as we know now, means not simply to spread political institutions which have been developed in the Western countries, but to help in spreading the better social and economic conditions which the English-speaking democracies have secured for their own citizens.

The British Commonwealth has a special responsibility for the peoples of the British Colonies. We have given up largely the use of the word "British Empire." Yet the peoples of the dependent Empire are British subjects no less than the citizens of Canada, Australia and South Africa. They number together sixty millions, and they inhabit vast territories. We are pledged to help them towards self-government and general well-being. We may be proud of their solidarity and their loyalty to us during this struggle. But we cannot be proud of our record in colonial administration during the last hundred years. The Colonies are, indeed, neglected estates, and their peoples, in spite in some cases of centuries of English administration, are sadly backward in economic, social and intellectual development. It is, too, a grave reflection that during the last century there has been an actual regression in our treatment of the native peoples of Africa. Whereas after the Napoleonic Wars the religious movement in England brought about a great popular agitation for the abolition of slavery throughout the British Realm, and the adoption of the principle of trusteeship by Great Britain for the native peoples, during the last half century the colour barriers have been raised in many of our Colonies, and the native has become in fact, if not in law, a serf.

It was claimed that the Mandate system of the League of Nations, which was introduced for the rule of territories in Africa and Polynesia that had been German colonies, was an application of English colonial ideas, since we had acted on the principle of being trustees for civilization. We flattered ourselves in that claim. The trusteeship which we proclaimed, but of which we did not have to give an account to any outside authority, was ill discharged for the peoples of the West Indies, West Africa and Kenya. Since we and the Dominions were granted the Mandates for the greater part of the German colonies, and have had to give an account of our administration

to the League of Nations, there has been a marked difference between the treatment of native peoples in the mandated territories and in the Colonies. Shortly before the outbreak of war, indeed, our conscience was aroused about the economic and labour conditions of the colonies under British rule. Royal Commissions had reported on the grossly low standard of life which was still the lot of the workers in the West Indies and Africa. In the early months of the war Parliament passed legislation by which the Colonial Development Fund, hitherto restricted to a maximum of £1,000,000 a year, should be raised to £5,000,000 a year. The increased sum, in the opinion of many, was still inadequate for the needs; and it is to be regretted that, so far, only a fraction of the larger amount has been actually voted for specific schemes in the Colonies.

During the years of the war we have been faced with the problems of the treatment of the native peoples in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and the South African Protectorates, which have long been felt to be a blot on our Imperial record. We have still to come to a fairer settlement with the self-governing Dominion of South Africa about those problems. It is a good augury that Field Marshal Smuts, the outstanding statesman of the Union of South Africa, and one of the most eminent statesmen of our time, has recently declared that at the end of the war a new relation must be sought between the white and coloured peoples of South Africa for the building up of a united and harmonious order. The common effort during the war of white man and black man to save Africa from Nazi domination, will help to a new outlook.

Generally, indeed, the English people during the struggle have manifested a growing recognition that colonial policy needs a radical change. Hitherto the dominant principle has been in the liberal tradition of *laisser faire*. The main business of the Government was to secure order and fair administration of justice, but to allow individual interests to direct economic development. That policy has meant the enrichment of members of the capitalist class of the ruling Power and a permanent impoverishment of the mass of the native peoples. We are coming to see that the conception of the social state, in which the Government is responsible for the economic well-being, the health, the education and the general advancement of the people must be applied in the Colonies no less than in the mother country. Lord Hailey, who has made a monumental survey of Africa, and Lord Moyne, the Secretary for the Colonies, have endorsed that conception. The other chief

colonial Powers, France and Holland, have been ahead of us in these respects. We may no longer lag behind. Our record about education is the least creditable. In great parts of Africa only a small minority of the native children receive any elementary education. The whole cost of Government help to the educational budget of the natives is derived from the taxation of the natives themselves, and the percentage of the revenue which is spent on education averages under two in East and West Africa. It is significant that in the Philippines the percentage is as high as 18 per cent. The health services and the agricultural services which we have established for the native peoples, if not as backward, are still altogether inadequate.

The Empire, as we have said, must be the responsibility not only of Great Britain but of the British Dominions. At present those Dominions are directly responsible only for the mandatory administration of territories in South West Africa and Polynesia, which were formerly German colonies. In the new order it is to be hoped that they will share with us the administration of all peoples in the British Empire not yet fit for self-government. It may be expected too that the U.S.A. which, during the war have entered into a treaty with us for common defence measures that affect immediately our Colonies in the American hemisphere, will take a fair part with us in the assistance not only of those Colonies, but of all the dependent peoples. Whatever may be the form of Government of such peoples, the experience since the last war suggests that the ruling Power should be definitely accountable for its trust to an international body. The two main purposes to which the administration must be directed are on the one hand the maintenance and advancement of the well-being of the native peoples, and on the other the education and preparation for self-government. They must be helped not only to political, but also to economic independence; and that will involve financial help in ample measure. The main cause of the permanent backwardness of the colonial peoples is their poverty. If they are to have freedom from want, it is the business of the advanced countries to come to their aid, not, as in the past, by investment for profit, which meant exploitation, but by co-operation and generous contribution.

It has been said that one of the foundations of the new order must be a Bill of duties and responsibilities of the governments parallel with a Bill of rights of the citizens; and the duties and responsibilities most obviously called for are to raise the con-

dition of the dependent peoples. The ugly phrase of the Japanese, which seems to us a mockery, the "co-prosperity sphere," should be translated in the British Empire into the reality of co-operation of white and coloured races for the well-being of the population. Then, indeed, the British Empire might become in the true sense of the word a British Commonwealth. That end clearly cannot be attained by the effort of Great Britain alone. We shall not have the substance or the men with which to carry out so vast a function. But the Dominions should be in a position to play an ever growing part in the development of the whole; and if the promise of the Atlantic Charter is sustained and the links between the British peoples and our English-speaking Allies are fortified, then America also, which has been critical of British imperialism, will be able to take her part in the common task. She and we together may give fulfilment to the ideal of her poet of democracy, Walt Whitman: "By God, I will accept nothing which all cannot have their counterpart of on the same terms."

CONSCRIPTION AND WOMEN

By Edith Summerskill, M.P.

IN December, 1941, a National Service Bill was introduced into the House of Commons which might in other days have created a Parliamentary storm of the first magnitude. It was unprecedented for it proposed to conscript the women of the country. And yet it passed all its stages in record time, and is now on the Statute Book.

Women view this new measure with mixed feelings. Many regard it as long overdue. Others feel it deals inequitably with spinsters while conferring favours on those able to produce a marriage certificate. The only organized protest in the lobby of the House came from women who demanded that in the event of conscription becoming law the Government should undertake to give to men and women equal pay for equal work and equal compensation for injuries received as the result of enemy action. In the House itself a few Members opposed the measure on the grounds that women should be afforded the maximum protection and that conscription would interfere with the sanctity of the home. These Members had also opposed the conscription of men, so that it was difficult to believe that their attitude arose solely from a desire to protect women.

Other interventions however struck a mid-Victorian note. There is a certain type of individual who is always ready to suspect the morals of women who indulge in activities outside the home and who is obsessed with the idea that a girl in uniform attracts certain undesirable characters. The girl may be a level headed, capable person, holding a responsible position in civilian life but apparently she loses all her graces immediately she enters the Services and becomes a sub-normal moral defective. She is unable to protect herself, even to the extent of screaming for help and must submit to the unwelcome attentions of any male who happens to cross her path. It is interesting to observe that there are still people who believe that the only serious harm that can threaten a woman is that of physical assault.

The periodic upheaval occasioned by war reveals that women have individualities of their own and are not merely adjuncts of men. They have aspirations and ambitions which become apparent in war time, because only then can they enjoy a real freedom to achieve at least some part of their heart's desire. But for the Crimean War Florence Nightingale would no doubt have continued to be the dutiful daughter of highly respectable parents. Her unwomanliness was deplored by her mother who believed that a lady should be satisfied with the shelter of her father's home until she exchanged his roof for that of her husband. It was scandalous that she should wish to nurse dirty soldiers. Women who did that were inviting trouble. And no doubt the grandfathers of those who whisper about the morals of the woman in the Services to-day opined that no respectable woman could become an army nurse and still preserve her chastity.

The great war of 1914-1918 provided a safety valve for the energies of hundreds of thousands of women. In the preceding years the suffragette movement had given evidence that women were showing signs of restlessness—that they were no longer willing to submit to a system in which certain privileges were enjoyed by one sex only. The fight for the suffrage was merely a symptom of the growing dissatisfaction with their place in the scheme of things and the war offered an opportunity to release them from a bondage which was growing irksome.

The 1919 Sex Disqualification Removal Act was the direct result of the war. Such a concession was surely not granted to women who were demoralized in the armament factories and in the auxiliary services. Four years of freedom to individuals who had hitherto led solitary, isolated lives, each securely shut up in her home, with very little opportunity of exchanging views other than with family and tradesmen must effect a profound change. The new woman who emerged had preserved her chastity, her morals were unsullied, but she had developed a mind of her own. She wanted to play her part in reconstruction. She hated war and sought to find a solution to the problems presented to the world. To express herself effectively she must have representation in Parliament, on local authorities and in the professions which had been barred to her on account of her sex. She demanded these things and got them.

Twenty years later she had to admit that her efforts to avert war had failed. The war drums were throbbing in the distance and once more she felt the call, not only to munition

work, to cooking, nursing or typing, but to the front line if necessary. The part which women are playing transcends anything which they accomplished in 1914. Yet this does not save them from the Jeremiahs who, ignoring the superb contribution which women are making to the war effort, can only see in this freedom the rapid moral and spiritual deterioration of our young womanhood. Those who fear for her morals should try to understand that the virtuous woman is not merely the one who lacks the opportunity to be otherwise. Also, though the uncertainty of life to-day is conducive to hasty marriages some of which are bound to fail, this is true of the relationships of men and women both in and out of the Services.

There are other individuals who fear that uniformed women will lose their femininity. One Eton crop combined with a long stride provides these people with a case from which to generalize. They forget or do not know that certain ductless glands determine the degree of femininity displayed by women and that it is scientifically impossible and quite unsound to suggest that a uniform, however severely cut, can influence the secretions of the hormones. The masculine type of woman will always be attracted to jobs generally performed by men. In peace time she will not be found in a chorus or a mannequin parade and in war time she gravitates towards some kind of mechanical work. As in civilian life, she is decidedly in the minority. A few members of the auxiliary services also apparently fear that the uniform may detract from their femininity, and no doubt that is the reason why they use cosmetics a little too freely. Those in authority have certainly not observed that the girls have ceased to be interested in their own physical charms, for instructions have been issued repeatedly that hair must be dressed neatly and not in the latest Hollywood style.

Women in uniform arrest the attention not because of any masculinity in their attire, but because they are abnormally uniform. We have been accustomed to see women exercising individuality—hundreds of them going to work, each wearing a different hat, whether it be in shape, colour or ornament. It did not need a war to teach the smart woman that a well-cut tailored ensemble would enhance her feminine charms, rather than detract from them. The pessimist who still believes that conscription and the consequent compulsory enrolment of a woman in the auxiliary services will produce an unsexed individual should take comfort in the knowledge that an

instructor—a doctor of philosophy—who has been appointed to plan recreation for the A.T.S. reports that the girls ask to learn dressmaking, child care and subjects which they may find useful in the future. This scarcely calls for explanation, for the urge to procreation sets normal men and women planning to have homes of their own.

It is regrettable that those who have persistently raised the question of the moral welfare of our young women, have not shown the same concern for their material well-being. Although a woman may be called upon to serve and perform the same duties as a man, her monetary value is assessed at four-fifths of that of her male colleague. If in the course of her work she is disabled and loses a limb or an eye, the loss again is reckoned as being worth only four-fifths of that of a man. The Government has never explained how a woman earning her living with her hands suffers less than a man through the loss of an arm. In fact her disability may mean the sacrifice of all her dreams of a home, husband and children, while a man may still find a wife who would be willing to care for him.

Service women find it difficult to make an organized protest in war time, but they keenly resent this differentiation. They find it difficult to reconcile the principles of democracy for which they are fighting with this inequitable treatment of their sex; equality of sacrifice, they feel, at least merits equality of pay. I am certain that the post-war woman will not tolerate this unfair discrimination in the labour market, and she will insist that she is worth five-fifths of a man if she performs the same work With the introduction of a scheme of family allowances the opponents of equal pay will probably find themselves stripped of the hoary argument that a man has dependents and should therefore receive a higher salary.

Fears have been expressed that communal feeding and crèches herald the disintegration of family life after the war. Some of the worst features of home life are certainly threatened, to the dismay of the domestic Hitlers who revel in the petty dictatorships which they have established. The freedom which women are enjoying to-day will spell the doom of home life as enjoyed by the male who is lord and master immediately he enters his own front door. I hope that communal feeding has convinced us of the stupid waste of fuel, food and labour entailed in millions of families each day cooking their meals on millions of separate gas stoves. It must at least have shown the housewife that she is not indispensable,

and that on occasions the family can feed well and cheaply, while she takes a day off to spend as she thinks fit. There is a curious belief which is shared by most men that women instinctively love cooking and washing up. A perfectly cooked meal is certainly an achievement and a woman may well experience considerable pleasure in producing a savoury and appetising dish. But I have never known ecstasy induced by washing up. Scraping, washing and drying dishes is a soul-destroying business and unfortunately takes twice as long as the eating of the meal; it is little wonder that a housewife complains that she has no time to call her own.

Marriage at the best for most people is rather a one-sided affair. While the husband has an opportunity of meeting people outside the home and exchanging ideas, the wife leads a rather isolated existence, which tends to make her more of an individualist, and keeps her comparatively uninformed on many subjects. This is in some measure due to the fact that the mother of young children has for the greater part of the day to try to assume the mental age of her youngest child. Crèches provide a release from this kind of nervous strain and consequent irritability and a well equipped day nursery, staffed by trained nurses, should be an indispensable part of our social services after the war. The post-war mother will demand this relief from the daily burden of trying to interpret and respond to the wishes of a youngster who needs the companionship of children of his own age. Communal feeding and crèches therefore will make some contribution towards improving the lives of housewives who, because of the nature of their work, are denied the enjoyment of certain cultural activities. A great deal of sentiment is talked about the position of the wife and mother in the home—she receives the love and respect of her family and what more can she wish?

This will not satisfy the post-war housewife who has tasted the joys of economic independence in the factories and the Services, and who will be critical of the status endured by her mother. She will argue, and quite rightly, that a woman in the home is making a contribution of inestimable value to the state and therefore that her rights should be safeguarded, together with those of other workers. She will probably ask awkward questions which will have to be answered. Why does legislation concerning the married woman lag behind legislation concerning other workers? Why is the housewife the only worker in the household denied the right of benefit under the National Health Insurance Acts, while she is often

the one most in need? Why do successive Governments disregard the anomalies in our unemployment regulations which concern the housewife? And why is she obliged to take the nationality of her husband, however ardently she wishes to retain her own? Why is a married woman who has devoted the whole of her single life to mastering a profession debarred from obtaining employment? Why is the work in the home not recognized as having a monetary value and a wife not legally entitled to one penny of the family income which she indirectly helps to earn? Why do Members of Parliament chiefly belong to one sex?

These questions will call for adequate answers. The woman toiling in this war has faced dangers and hardships and has accustomed herself to ugly sights and situations. She has learned to think and will not be put off by pretty speeches and promises. She will ask for no privileges, but she will demand her rights in no uncertain voice.

In short, the war will have given her a poise which was totally lacking before she had an opportunity of learning for herself that her alleged timidity, lack of balance, and absence of intellectual ability have no foundation in fact. If conscription should promote such an awakening in the women of Britain then it will be amply justified apart from its immediate effect on the war effort.

CHRISTIANITY AND RECONSTRUCTION

By Canon F. A. Cockin

NOT long ago a distinguished theological scholar, well known for his active interest in the bearing of Christian thought upon the problems of society, was discussing with a group of scientists in his own senior common room the universal question of post-war reconstruction. After a while he raised the question of the part which Christianity might be expected to play in this re-ordering of life—to be met with the blunt retort: "But you Christians won't have anything to do with this: this is going to be our concern!"

The incident is typical of an attitude which is widespread. In recent issues of *The Times Educational Supplement* there appeared three very stimulating articles by Professor Julian Huxley on the subject of "Education as a Social Function." In the first article, which dealt with modern trends in educational theory and practice, he noted as one of the most significant of these

> an increased concern with the future, and with the possibility of approximating to ideal but scientific standards: and obversely a decreased concern with the past, and with the imposition of ideal but non-scientific (philosophical or religious) norms derived from the past.

The implication is obvious. Religion, and with it philosophy, that dangerous branch of knowledge which suffers from the possession of an over-long ancestry, and which has more than once fallen from grace by showing itself the ally of religion, are to be discarded. They are to be replaced by a discipline which prides itself on its readiness to break with the past, and on its repudiation of the improper practice of "imposing" any norm of thought or conduct upon what should be man's free and unfettered "approximation to ideal but scientific standards."

Nor is such a point of view characteristic only of pure science. Economics, technology, psychology would all tell the same story. In the welter of discussion and planning by which we are surrounded, it is taken for granted that these and similar "techniques" will have a determinating influence upon the future. They will in fact take over the task which Chris-

tianity has attempted to discharge, in an amateurish and ineffective way, for the last fifteen centuries or so, and will set themselves by a thorough attention to what are described as "man's basic needs," to introduce an order of life in which the great enemies of human happiness, poverty, insecurity, ignorance, disease and the like will be "scientifically" tackled and disposed of.

One must avoid overstating the case. There are not a few among the scientific authorities themselves who recognize, as clearly as any Christian, the underlying need of a new motive, a new temper, if man is to be rescued from his present parlous situation. But they just do not believe that religion can any longer supply what is lacking. They fall back upon the hope that the removal of many of the material, and indeed intellectual, disabilities, which have for so long hampered man in his efforts to attain the good life, will somehow spontaneously engender a "new spirit" which will supply the incentive that religion has failed to provide.

No one but a fool would wish to deny or underestimate the truth which these views contain. It is painfully clear that the Christian Church has increasingly lost the power to convince more than a small minority that it possesses the clue to the new order of human society, or the secret of that moral dynamic which enables man to meet the demand for sacrifice of personal privilege and advantage which that new order will entail.

It is equally clear that the kind of reconstruction, national and international, for which we are looking, will involve the harnessing of the resources of scientific knowledge to the tasks of the common-wealth on an unprecedented scale; and the "imposition" (I do not think, *pace* Professor Huxley, there is any getting away from it) of a measure of disciplined planning such as we in this country have never known. But I am none the less convinced that some of the assumptions involved (and not always very clearly stated), in this demand for a life directed by science rather than by religion require a good deal more examination.

One wonders sometimes whether these confident prophets ever cast a glance over their shoulder at the history of the last two hundred, or even the last twenty, years. This prospect of a new earth—heaven of course can be disregarded—in which dwell prosperity, security and peace, seems somehow difficult to reconcile with the recurrence, most notably in the more recent period, of occasions on which very competent and

promising attempts to achieve it have suffered shipwreck on the rock of one strange but stubborn fact, that men did not seem to *want* the proffered millennium, or that if they did, they were unable to produce the "good will" necessary to its achievement.

The lessons of recent history are sufficiently plain. But they need to be reinforced by a more far reaching study of the nature of our European civilization, before we are really in a position to understand what is involved in this proposal to jettison Christian faith and philosophy.

Within the last eighteen months there have appeared two very remarkable books, Mr. C. N. Cochrane's *Christianity and Classical Culture*, and Professor R. G. Collingwood's *Essay on Metaphysics*. Working in different fields they both set out to maintain the same fundamental thesis, that the whole structure of European life is built upon a radically Christian foundation.

The purpose of Mr. Cochrane's work is to demonstrate the nature of the revolution effected by the great Christian thinkers from Athanasius to Augustine in the entire order of Graeco-Roman thought and life. He illustrates by copious reference to Greek and Latin literature the nature of the impasse at which poets, philosophers, historians and statesmen had arrived through the failure to discover a true "logos," a true principle or rationale of life, which alike in thought and action would enable man to make sense both of his universe and of his state. And he lays bare with penetrating insight the nature of the solution achieved by the introduction of the Christian "logos," with its substitution for the uneasy compromise between human capacity (*virtus*) and the incalculable element of circumstance (*fortuna*) of a new single comprehensive principle governing every event in nature and history, the will of God. The Greek *polis* and the Roman empire died for lack of a true metaphysic. Christianity—not without some false starts and wrong turnings—succeeded in salvaging the best of the life of both by providing it with a new metaphysic, the metaphysic of the Catholic faith. By so doing it reintegrated not only the ethic but the philosophy and the science of the ancient world.

Professor Collingwood develops the same theme in the field of pure metaphysics. He establishes the connection between the Christian philosophers and the main tradition of Greek philosophical thought as being not a mere syncretism, or a dilution of the main stream of Christian thought by the infiltration of Hellenistic elements, but a clear and deliberate

criticism and revaluation of Greek thought at certain specific points at which Hebrew-Christian monotheism corrected classical speculation whether idealistic or materialistic. His whole essay is a passionate plea for the recovery of that truly Christian metaphysical tradition which has been the root and the spring of European civilization.

The reintegration achieved in the 4th century lasted for something like a thousand years. Upon the question of how it broke up, and of what has happened to it since, opinions differ. The true nature of the Reformation is a subject which had perhaps better be left for discussion in those journals in which theologians wash their own particular brand of dirty linen. But on any view it is clear that the Reformation was an attempt to revivify the great tradition: and its astonishing effect in the outburst of theological life, in part healthy, in part morbid, showed that men recognized in the attempt something to which they instinctively responded. For good or ill it has left its mark upon the whole of subsequent European history. The Wesleyan movement and the Catholic revival are the two latest illustrations of the same truth. The civilization of Europe has been a religious civilization, a Christian civilization. If it seeks to remake itself now on another basis, it will cease to be European in the sense in which we have understood that word up to now.

But we can go deeper than the argument from history. Whatever the resources of scientific, economic and political knowledge which we bring to bear upon the problems of reconstruction, there is one fact from which we cannot escape. The reconstruction will be carried out—and still more important, it will have to be maintained—by man, *homo sapiens*. And the ultimate question which therefore confronts anyone who seeks to plan human life is the question: What is man? Indeed it is not the ultimate question: it is the first.

We have had a good many answers to the question during the past two or three hundred years. During that period we have attempted to build civilization upon assumptions which have claimed in turn to have discovered the essential truth of man's nature. He has been classified as the political man, the economic man, the scientific man, the psychological man, most recently as the mass man. Even when he has been regarded as "the bearer of rights and duties," these have too often been conceived in too abstract terms as purely legal and constitutional. In greater or less degree all these descriptions have ignored the essential truth about him, which is that he

is a spiritual being, a soul, with a destiny in this world and beyond it, and that his destiny in this world can be neither truly understood nor truly fulfilled if it is regarded as falling entirely within this world.

Because we have ignored this fact, we and our fathers have constructed theories and systems of society designed to reach the millennium, which could afford to dispense with God. We have achieved miracles of scientific, and in some respects of economic, progress. And now we have come to the end of that road. We have lost God—and we have not exactly found the millennium.

The contemporary mind witnesses to the truth of this. In recent years shrewd observers have marked the symptoms which indicated a condition of acute strain. There is the sense of confusion, aimlessness and futility—*The Waste Land* is sufficient illustration. There is the recrudescence of the resort to magic, the reappearance of that old pagan conception of *fortuna*, a sure sign of the collapse not only of healthy religion, but of healthy thought. There is, most significant, and rightly interpreted a source of encouragement, the feeling of dismay and shame at the collapse of so much in which we have trusted.

This is not, I need hardly say, the whole story. It would be untrue and ungenerous to ignore the signs of new life already springing amid the decay of the old.

First, and most obvious, especially to those who have had the good fortune to live in close contact with the mind of the young, there is the new passion for social justice. Often enough it takes crude forms. Denied, as it largely has been in this country, any effective outlet in a crusade for the removal of injustice, it has often spent itself in facile theorizing or in a rather pathetic imitation of foreign brands of revolutionary thought. It has not yet found any expression native to the genius of our people. Above all it has not yet found the religious motive, which would at once give it the passion of devotion to a cause, and save it from the barbarous extremes into which, as we know well, reforming zeal, not so directed, can run. But it is there, pent up just below the surface by the restraints of war. It will break out again, the moment they are relaxed: and woe betide this nation if we are not ready to meet it and give it an outlet in action.

In the second place there is the growing realization that this passion for justice must be an intelligent passion, trained, and equipped with knowledge. There are few more hopeful signs at the present moment than the growing demand not only for

a radical reshaping of our educational system, but also for a radical rethinking of our philosophy of education. It is dangerous of course: the air is full of ideas, some of them patently too idealistic to have a chance of fulfilment, others ominously indicative of what a "planned" education might turn out to be in the wrong hands. And again the only real safeguard is to go back to the fundamental question—What is man? What are the true needs of his nature? It is only in the light of the answer to that question that we can know what educating him means.

But deeper than either of these there lies a third demand, the demand implied in that significant phrase "design for living." Beneath all the diverse and sometimes bizarre suggestions for that design there lies the same insistent need, the need of a "logos," a principle, which will enable men to integrate, and so make sense of, the fragmentary incoherent moments of their experience. This is a need which touches the deepest levels of man's life, his relations within the family and in society, his sense of purposefulness in his work or profession, the very integrity of his own personal existence. Unless it is met he will be doomed to a continued frustration in which his superficial needs are increasingly supplied while his deepest nature remains starved and sterile.

If this analysis is anywhere near the truth one conclusion at least is obvious. The ultimate problem of reconstruction is not one which can be handled by the sciences. They have their contribution to make, a contribution without which no comprehensive solution can be found. But the root of the trouble lies in the soul of man, and that in no narrow individualistic sense. These demands which I have just touched on, for social justice, for an education which shall more truly fit each generation to take an intelligent and active part in the shaping of the common good, for an intelligible pattern of personal living, these are demands the satisfaction of which cannot be found merely by a more competent adjustment of material resources. They are demands for a new motive, a new quality, in our whole community life. They are demands of the human spirit.

The question is whether Christianity can meet them, and *on what terms*. I use this phrase deliberately since it expresses the real crux of the problem. It is obvious that increasing numbers of men and women are looking, not indeed very hopefully but as a last resource, to religion. It is equally clear that to most of them religion, as they see it embodied in the life of

the Churches, seems incapable of doing what they know it has done in the past, and what they would fain see it do again. They feel that it must radically reshape itself to meet the needs and requirements of a new age. In the second of those articles to which I referred previously Professor Huxley asks that the Churches should "recast their theologies in forms acceptable to the new phase of the Western world." It would be difficult to find a phrase in which truth and dangerous error are more subtly blended. It would not perhaps be unfair to ask to which particular new phases of the Western world the reformed theology is to be acceptable. But the issue is far too grave for making debating points. The whole thing turns of course on what is meant by "recasting" the Christian theology.

Certain things are clear enough. There is a crying need for Christianity to recover the capacity to formulate its ethical principles in a form which can give direction not only in the problems of personal life, but in the far more complex and difficult sphere of the large scale relationships of industry and politics. There is an equally urgent need for Christian theology to state its doctrine of God in language which, while it can never be in the strict sense of the word "scientific," conveys a conception of his relation to life which is at least intelligible to minds accustomed to thinking in terms of scientific discovery.

But to some at least it seems that the question needs to be stated the other way round. We are constantly told that there can be no going back, that it is hopeless to ask the modern mind to return to beliefs which it has discarded as antiquated and irrelvant. It is perhaps worth asking whether this is not the best course to follow when one finds that one has strayed off the track in difficult country with the mist coming down. There are times when it is wise to try to find the track again: and that may sometimes mean turning back to look for the point at which one lost it.

This is not a plea for a mere return to dogmatic antiquarianism. The task of finding the right track again is one which in itself will call for the combined output of all the ability, historical, philosophical, theological and scientific, which we can muster. For it was not yesterday that European thought took a wrong turning. And in that slow and painful process of getting our bearings again it will not, I venture to predict, be theology alone that has to undergo some "recasting."

CECIL RHODES AND EDUCATION TO-DAY

By Lord Elton

WHEN Cecil Rhodes founded his Scholarships he was doing what we are doing to-day: he was looking for leaders. Or is it possible that we are not looking for leaders to-day? Certainly during the armistice between the two world wars—when most intellectual fashions were dictated by men who were in revolt against the war of 1914-18, against the men who had fought it and the virtues which had won it—it was not infrequently suggested that leadership was incompatible with democracy, and had somehow been tainted by the *fuehrer prinzip*. It seems doubtful however whether just now, *consule* Churchill, even Bloomsbury would maintain the thesis that leadership is a superfluous or alien quality (although there may be some distant kinship between this degenerate notion and the taste for Gallup polls and straw votes, which, with some at least, represents the instinct to replace the statesman and the expert by the collective wisdom of the irresponsible and the uninstructed). If, after a survey of the motley politicians from whom a successor to the present Prime Minister would have to be selected, we were to assert that few embryo Churchills obtrude themselves upon the inquiring and anxious gaze, would this not be an understatement of an almost breathtaking variety? Reforms of our educational slstem are a-planning: will they be reforms which will train us leaders? Hardly; for in that increased clambering which is intended upon the ladder of opportunity, the fortunate clamberers will have been picked by the examination system with which we are already familiar, by a series, that is, of intelligence tests, in which the successful will, in effect, be those best able to absorb and reproduce other peoples' ideas. A system, this, which is capable, at its worst, of passing a spineless bookworm up from scholarship to scholarship, until the final triumph forces an entry to Whitehall, and leaves him passing-to-you-please for the rest of his natural life. Our examination system seeks out intelligences only; and man does not live, or, for that matter, choose a new

pipe, by intelligence alone—how comparatively easy life would be, if he did! It hardly seems dangerous to hazard the guess that until our examinations themselves deliberately seek out all the qualities which go to make leaders, and not one only, our education itself, whatever else it finds for us, will not find sufficient leaders.

Which brings us back to Cecil Rhodes. For it makes a suitable starting point for a consideration of his scholarships to remind ourselves that Cecil Rhodes (who had a passion for education, and laboriously returned to Oxford from his African career to read for a degree) could never have won a scholarship. He never possessed, for one thing, the much over-rated gift of literary self-expression. Moreover he was so full of gigantic rough-hewn ideas of his own that all his life, and particularly in his boyhood, they served as a kind of non-conductor for the ideas of other people. Like Shakespeare, like Cromwell and Nelson, like Winston Churchill, maybe, himself, he would never have ascended the ladder of our present examination system. He wanted leaders, and yet he knew, none better, that tests in book-digestion alone could never be relied upon to pick them. He wanted leaders who would "esteem the performance of public duties their highest aim." He wanted leaders who would spread the civilization of the English-speaking races all over the globe. It was because he wished to spread civilization, and believed that the English-speaking races were the chosen instrument for spreading it, that he laboriously amassed his wealth. His original idea had been a secret society, on the model of the Jesuits, to serve the interests of the British Commonwealth. And then he hit upon the scholarships.

He wanted leaders: and he did not believe that book-learning and facility with the pen could be relied upon, by themselves, to provide them. How could he have believed this—for he possessed neither of these gifts himself, yet he cannot have doubted that he was a born leader? There is an amusing passage in his fifth will, the will which founded the scholarships, in which he speaks of the Oriel dons as living "secluded from the world and so live like children as to commercial matters." These were men after all who had climbed to the summit of the educational ladder of their day by the customary rungs and, for all he could see, they were not even to be trusted to use his legacy to their college with practical commonsense. And, although of this there is no trace in the will, the inarticulate young genius, so conscientiously return-

ing from his African adventures to read for his Pass degree at Oxford, must often have felt a sardonic amusement at the raw and condescending omniscience of some members of the undergraduate intelligentzia. The queer young "colonial" may even have experienced irritating slights from the College highbrows, and it would have been pardonable enough if, in a natural revulsion, he had provided that his scholarships should go to brawny he-men, hearty athletes, potential pioneers—anything rather than the ineffective intellectuals who sometimes emerged as laureates of the traditional scholarship system. Indeed Rhodes' scholarships have sometimes, quite mistakenly, been spoken of as if this had indeed been the Founder's purpose, and as if his scholars were customarily men of brawn rather than brain. Nothing could be further from the truth. Rhodes believed in all-round men. In his will he laid down almost meticulous instructions as to the qualities which those who would one day select his scholars were to look for; and though he included athletic prowess, it was at the bottom of the list. What his instructions amounted to can be briefly summarized. The Rhodes scholar should either possess exceptional intellect founded upon sound character, or exceptional character founded upon sound intellect.

All history, surely, is witness to the wisdom of this prescription. Can any great achievement be pointed to, to which there has not gone both remarkable intellect and remarkable character? A few, perhaps, a very few, in the field of pure literature, or of science, but none, I think, on the path of "public duties" with which Rhodes was specially concerned. The picking of potential leaders from young men between nineteen and twenty-five is naturally at best a tricky business—made no easier by the fact that a candidate's intellectual powers will already have been officially graded at school or college, while as to his character selectors will have to rely upon much less concrete estimates and impressions. In spite of which, selection committees, all over the British Commonwealth, have done their work, on the whole, with remarkable success. There are even statistics to show that, of recent years, a higher percentage of Rhodes Scholars, than of open Scholars or Exhibitioners from British Schools, chosen on a pure intelligence test, have obtained a First in the Oxford Final Honour Schools. And, although here no statistics are available, it seems very probable that a higher proportion of them have fulfilled the Founder's purpose by achieving distinction,

in later life, in the "performance of public duties." Norman Rogers, the Canadian War Minister, who perished so tragically in an air disaster not long ago, was but one particularly outstanding example of many former Rhodes Scholars who are playing leading parts both in the British Commonwealth and in the United States.

We need more leaders, and shall need them increasingly. The totalitarian states, with which we have to measure ourselves in the evolutionary struggle for survival, have hardly yet outgrown their revolutionary phase; which means that not only their three or four Biggest Shots, but all their administrative chiefs will be men who have forced and fought their way upwards through the lava of a Society in eruption. Such men will doubtless lack many of the Christian virtues, but they are likely to possess quick wits, resolution, drive, ruthlessness and fanaticism in abundance. Does a survey of our own system suggest that it can be relied upon to find for its high places the dynamic qualities needed to compete effectively with such opponents? We think of some polished, weary Under-Secretary, inheritor of the nineteenth century tradition that it is the first business of the Civil Service to point out difficulties; of some bellicose politician who went on urging us to spend our money on comfort, instead of arms, long after the Germans had given up butter for guns: it would be difficult to answer with a confident Yes. This is not, of course, by any means altogether the fault of our education. Our leaders are picked for us by a score of other agencies; by the Trade Unions, by big business, by Fleet Street, by Broadcasting House, by heredity, by nepotism, by their own powerful lungs, sometimes even by the Church.

British education, fortunately, is not anything like so one-sided as our examination system would suggest. For a hundred years the public schools, as they are somewhat absurdly called, have been setting an invaluable example of emphasis on the training of character. Life in one of these—'residential' schools would be a better label than 'public'—involves an early and thorough training in citizenship. Like the trade unions they have been too inclined to serve the interests of a class, but like the trade unions they have made an invaluable training ground for leaders, and it was only natural that most of the publicists who preached decadence and defeatism between the two world wars should have assailed the public schools with special persistence and rancour. It is devoutly to be hoped that after the war, shorn of their excessive class

bias, they will extend their fertilizing tradition of character-training over wider areas than ever before. The non-residential secondary and primary schools, which, through State and Local Education Authority scholarships, nowadays supply so many of the rungs of the educational ladder of opportunity, have not yet developed quite the same emphasis on character-training. It is to them principally that the Master of Balliol's words apply—"to be trained from early youth to think about nothing but examinations is an experience which only the strongest mind can survive." Moreover one short-sighted practice in the public schools themselves in a roundabout way has done a good deal to discredit all qualities save intelligence in the successful examinee. Too many public schools have allowed the tradition to grow up that authority, in the great system of self-government which they inherited from Arnold, is best exercised by athletes. This perversion of the Arnold tradition (for Arnold made the Sixth form his oligarchy) overlooks the fact that though the hefty forward or the hawk-eyed batsman, whom the young so readily admire, may often enough lack brains, it does not by any means necessarily follow that they possess character. Meanwhile, excluded from early responsibility, the unmuscular but intelligent adolescent, half envious and half scornful of the somewhat bovine school aristocracy, is apt to grow up with a strong unconscious bias towards criticism and opposition, a tendency to over-value the quick wits which he possesses, and to under-value the responsibility and experience which he has not been allowed to acquire. If later life does not supply a corrective, he may even grow into an incurable No man, and nurse through life a secret inferiority complex, for which Personages in general are but the prefects of his schooldays somewhat larger than life size, and evoke the old mixture of envy and contempt. It is this small minority of malcontent intellectuals which has been responsible for most of the sustained campaign against the public schools and their traditional emphasis on character.

Despite all, however, it is fair to say that, in general, even though the rungs of the educational ladder itself may consist merely of literary intelligence tests, the very nature of the British educational tradition ensures that a respectable proportion of candidates will have developed at school the qualities of character which are the indispensable complement of mere intelligence. Only, the would-be scholars are not tested in these. And as the University commoners, supported

by no public funds, become fewer and fewer, the influence of the public school tradition is bound to decrease.

An increased bias towards placing value on character in the examination system would soon impose analogous changes on education itself. In the examinations for the Civil Service, for Sandhurst, Woolwich and elsewhere, considerable weight is already given to the "interview." The same practice should be extended to every rung of the scholarship ladder. It would not be long before it had affected the whole school curriculum.

There is plenty of evidence that the schools themselves have for some while already been moving towards some such development. Indeed the residential schools have transformed themselves in a generation. I passed through both my "preparatory" and "public" schools without spending an hour on any sort of handwork whatever; to my lasting loss, no drawing, no carpentry, no gardening, no engineering came my way. This meant an ill-balanced education, which would have mattered much less, but for the compulsory ball-games which filled the afternoons in which Tom Brown and his contemporaries fished, ferreted or birds-nested at their own sweet will. To-day, with its gardens, carpentry-shops, scout-troops and farm-contingents there is no boarding school which does not train its pupils to use their hands as well as their brains. Again, the so-called County Badge Scheme, already in operation in many parts of the country, forecasts in part the pattern of the education of the future. By this a boy is required not only to reach certain standards, in running, jumping, throwing or swimming, but to carry out an exploration, sail a boat at sea, make something with his own hands. I foresee the time when some such certificates of achievement as these—extended, and developed, all up the educational ladder, and dovetailed into the intelligence tests of the orthodox scholarship tradition—will be as indispensable to the ambitious young man as his First in Greats. When, in addition, every scholarship examination, from the earliest, involves an appraisal, modelled on the Rhodes tradition, of character as well as book-digestion, not only shall we have greatly widened the rungs of the competitive ladder, but we shall have laid the foundations of the education of the future, the complete education of complete men and women, an education fit to find us leadership for an age of Blitzkriegs.

LOST LEADERS

By G. Rostrevor Hamilton

> From the poet-writer's standpoint all this prevalent talk about a New Order is sheer waste of time. There never will be a new order, and there never has been an old one .... what I hope for and work for to-day is for a mess more favourable to artists than is the present one .... A work of art .... is the only material object in the universe which may possess internal harmony.
>
> —E. M. Forster, in *The New Disorder* (*Horizon*. December, 1941).

> *sed nil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere*
> *edita doctrina sapientum templa serena,*
> *despicere unde queas .....*
>
> Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* II, 7-9.

SUPPOSE a glory of arms, victory gained outright;
Then swift ignoble collapse, or tired gradual blight:
Suppose in loud *Te Deum* bells ringing again,
And candles of false peace lit over mounds of slain.

Then, Wise Ones, in late grief shall we congratulate
You who advise us now to hope no other fate?
"These"—shall we say?—"were the clear-eyed prophets, not content
To be wise, like some poor fools, after the proved event."

"These"—shall we say?—"had learned from history's mottled page
No cosmos out of chaos comes, no golden age
From iron, nothing new beneath the visiting sun
But new disorder still, old discord new begun;

With, at the best, more ease for artist-souls serene
To gaze from guarded heights down on the stormy scene
Where crowds jostle and strive, and in seclusion make
Order, as only the artist can, for Art's own sake."

So shall we speak, in praise? Or, "These men"—shall we say?—
"Were disillusioned souls, lost leaders of their day;
Who, lightning-struck with Art's great order, could not see
In the common life of man the home-bred harmony,

Order of days and ways, sharing of warmth and food,
Family, friendship, love, working to brotherhood,
And order, less or more, but order truly named,
Even in parliaments and wider unions framed.

These were the gifted men, who sneered at statesmen's schemes
As rhetoric, will-o'-the-wisp, the will's deceiving dreams;
These, bitten once, were shy not only twice or thrice,
But sensed in each new plan a new fool's paradise,

And, when all strongest hopes were needed for success
And nothing on God's earth could fail like hopelessness,
On our light foolish heads their wisdom helped to draw,
By weakening our faith, the failure they foresaw."

POINTS OF VIEW

I. The Miner

By B. L. Coombes

I BELIEVE that few workers are more confused than miners in these days. They are exhorted to produce more, and are instructed in their behaviour by folk who show very clearly that they have no knowledge of what happens in the dark galleries below the surface of this land.

I have worked for many years as a miner but I try to value other points of view and to weigh them against the things which happen to us and influence our outlook. There is a shortage of coal and the usual inference is that miners are not doing their utmost when at work or are taking more time off than is allowed. The colliery companies are responsible for output as on that factor their profits depend; so they take care to see that the maximum is gained, and manage the workings in the way they consider best for that purpose.

The men do not always agree with the methods of working but their objections seem to have little effect, even in wartime. They may not understand all the administrative difficulties but many of them know the way to control roof and to handle the changes in the various seams better than the officials. During the last few years a change has come in the type of mine officials. A man is not now chosen for promotion because of his ability to do the hardest and most dangerous jobs. A little theory is now counted to outweigh years of experience so that many men are in charge who have never done the hard work of a miner; often it is that fact which has caused them to become officials. The miner feels a contempt for this type. If he has to be ordered to do a job he likes to feel that the instructor knows what he is talking about, especially in an industry where danger is ever at his elbow and the casualty list for ten years is far above a million and a half.

Often the workman knows a quicker and safer way of doing a job, but he must obey instructions. I have seen whole districts idle and hundreds of tons lost through the stupidity of

an under official but he will have first and most favoured hearing from the manager and very often the blame goes to the wrong man. This type of official has no use for the craftsmanship of the mines. He has not the experience to sense the need for a good job of roof repairing, for the neatly trimmed working place or the heading that runs straight and neat through the coal. He does not want men who know more than he does so he fosters younger men who have not matured to their job and are ready to "tear the coal up by the hair," as the saying goes, and are ready to run any risks for a few extra shillings. The resultant rush and scramble means irregular working and often falls which hinder the output—sometimes there are worse results.

In the early days the older workman might lose some output, but the roof he timbered would hold; his coal slips would be "shaped" so that his output would be sure and regular each day; and his straight and well laid roadway would carry the coal trams and give quick dispatch instead of the continual delays that come with slovenly laying. He would be at work every day and his output would come back as regularly as the evenings come to the valleys. That is the ideal which I feel should be aimed at—a reasonable output every day, rather than records one day and the transport all blocked and then a series of half outputs until the places are again got ready for the rush. Unless different methods are used all the highly skilled men will be driven from the mines. Their loss will hit the mining communities for the boys or young men brought up alongside a conveyor are not able to handle the difficult repairing jobs back on the roadways.

There was a time when miners took their sons to work with them, leading them carefully through the dangers of the mine and teaching them all the skill with hand and head that many years in the darkness had given to them. Nowadays no miner will let his son go underground if he can avoid it. "What has mining done for the likes of me?" They all ask the same question. "Given me nothing but slave driving and silicosis and likely enough the parish at the end. My boy shan't go through that. Let him get something safer and cleaner."

To many of us the complaint of coal shortage has a queer sound. We recall that not many months ago hundreds of miners from these areas where I live were ordered away to work. There were no coal orders we were told, and no possible prospect for the coal industry; so miners would be more patriotic if they left their homes and went to work on aero-

drome sites and other jobs. In bitter winter weather men who had always worked in hot seams were sent to outdoor work. Many suffered severely and I know of some deaths as a direct result. Then, when the warmer weather came and the men could work longer hours in better conditions the same people who forced them away discovered that they were urgently needed at the mines and so they must forsake their new jobs and homes to return. We feel that this fool changing may happen again at any time and when men hear of the need for coal they comment "Yes, I suppose. So that we can again be chucked on the road." Some had found good jobs away where the work was easier and much more pleasant. They found that the rewards were higher too and did not want to return. One mate told me that he had been sending more money each week to his wife while he was away than he had earned altogether since he had come back to his old job in the mine.

About this time the Labour Exchange did some queer things—nothing unusual in our experience of that service. I will give but one instance, typical of many. A close relative of my own was sent away from an ailing wife and four tiny children last spring. He had always worked in a warm mine and the change to outdoor work aggravated a bodily complaint that he had. He lost time through illness and more through the bad weather. But presently the weather and his health improved and he started to enjoy the outdoor work. Promptly came the command to return to the mines. He found that his old job was vacant and that the manager would like to have him back. Glad in the prospect of re-joining his family he journeyed home. His wife was so ill that the oldest boy of six had had to do all the shopping for the isolated household, and comfort the family when the raiders roared overhead. On his arrival the Labour Exchange informed him—and they saw no need to be civil—that his job was at a colliery in Nottingham. He explained about his old job being vacant and his home conditions. They were not interested, except to state that they would bring a man from away to do that job. Apparently they intended paying two lots of travelling expenses, two lodging allowances, breaking up two homes and forcing two miners to work in strange seams. To me their only excuse seemed that two jobs could be shown as having been found instead of one. In this case the miner had friends who could fight his case and they did so. Our Miners' Federation checked that bit of stupidity successfully.

Such happenings do not ease the bitterness left by decades of industrial warfare in these areas. I feel that most of the miners are thinking of the past and its happenings while the coalowners are very definitely looking to their own future. I am a miners' committee man and every week we have a pile of minor disputes to handle. I think these are more frequent now than before the war. Far more give and take is needed on both sides, but I have felt that efforts at co-operation have not been very successful. Sometimes when the men's side of the production committee urge a certain course they are asked: "Who's managing this colliery? You or us?" The result is that the committee loses its enthusiasm, yet they are in an ideal position to know the needs.

They know that a great waste of time and material is often hidden below the surface. Workmen are shifted back and fore from very warm places to others in which the air current is bitterly cold. Sometimes this happens more than once in the same shift and it can often be avoided. That way comes the loss of work through colds and weakened chests. I know of men who are away for months through these chills yet they have no claim for compensation. It is quite usual for a repairer to have to carry his heavy load of tools half a mile along the mine roadways, and very often he meets another of his mates carrying tools in the opposite direction to do the same kind of work. How many hours would be saved if this could be avoided? Also, during the daily rush, timber and steel arches are often sent to a part of the mine where they will not be needed for a while. The next repairing shift may want them badly, but in another section of the mine. Then comes the delay of loading again and bringing them back through all the intricate ways of the colliery—while repairers wait for their arrival. Short pieces of timber are often left about the sides and are a danger to transport. If these pieces were collected and sent to the saw mills they could be made into wedges for tightening posts. A little real thought and organization could save a deal of time and temper in these matters. There seems a desire always to save expense on the repairs of a colliery and it is usually the repairers who are stopped from working. I feel this to be doubtful policy as it is useless filling trams at the coal face unless they can be got back along the main roads.

In many collieries there is a surplus of officials and some of them could be put to coal cutting. Colliers are paid by the ton and the work of most day wage men is so arranged and inter-

woven that there is little chance of slacking. Apart from safety conditions there is little need to watch the men at work and I feel that many who are so doing would be much better employed at producing for this time of emergency. When you find an average of one official to every ten men or boys I feel sure that at least a quarter of the watchers are surplus. I know that a colliery manager has a difficult job to handle. He is deluged by regulations, worried by the lack of machinery and the belated arrival of supplies, and above all he must get coal out at a cheap rate. He must leave much of the underground control to the under officials and in this I feel that a swift change to more practical men is needed. The miner, always dreading a big explosion or other accident, is concerned about the type of man who will have his life in keeping if the disaster should come. I know there are mines where the choice of these men is not the manager's.

If coal is scarce why is so much thrown into the waste "gobs" and left for ever? This happens every working day and some men do little else. Quite recently I saw two men working without cease all through the night; they surely handled fifteen tons of coal but none of it will ever be seen in daylight. Every morning I pass a colliery which is well equipped for producing a large amount of coal and the seams are still only partly worked, yet not one ton has brightened the rails during the last twelve months. Why should modern machinery stand idle and why should the sixty or more coal trams that are outside be left rusting upon the rails? They are easily moved and could have carried many thousands of tons during that period. Recently I have seen coal being unloaded at the pit sidings so that the trucks could be filled again and the work kept going. Those who handle our transport problems blame the methods of the railways. I know well that miners from a distance who are entitled to cheap coal as part of their wages have great trouble in getting that coal delivered to them.

There is certainly absenteeism, some avoidable and some not. Often the man who is most keen to work may lose time because of an injury which he does not report—feeling he will be back at work in a day or two. His case might seem to be one of deliberate absenteeism. Then a foggy morning may defeat a man whose chest has been weakened by dust or on whom silicosis is starting its fatal grip. Many men are dubious about the new method of deducting income tax and I feel that time has been lost because of that. There are stand

ing deductions of over four shillings weekly for insurances and other social services and many pay five or six shillings weekly in fares to work—and they are not allowed rebate on this. When several shillings again are taken off the docket for income tax the man begins to wonder what he is working for and the wife wants to know why there is such a gap between the £3 15s. or £4 that the average mine worker is shown to have earned and the amount which he has left to bring home.

The bulk of avoidable absenteeism is amongst the younger men who have no responsibilities and earn the highest wages. Many of these lose Saturday regularly and there can be no excuse for this. They should be checked, and I feel a good antidote would be better treatment of the married and older men who have more need of the money that is to be got in the best places. A proportion of these men earn high wages because they are lucky in their working places or have private arrangements with the officials. Possibly one-fourth would come under this heading but the remainder do not earn enough to take a day off even when ill, if they can crawl to work. I doubt, however, if it is profitable to man or State to work when unfit. Often a day or two resting might prevent a month in bed. A labourer underground getting a wage of about £3 13s. for a full week's work before any deductions are made cannot afford to be absent, neither can the hauliers, rope riders and other day workers whose wages are but little higher and who number, with the ordinary colliers, three-fourths of the workers underground. The better paid ones who absent themselves may be the cause of the lower paid being further penalized; for these may be sent back when not enough colliers are working.

In South Wales there has long been a system whereby the men on the afternoon or night shift lose a bonus turn if they are absent from work one day in the week—therefore they lose two days' pay by being once absent. No workman is going to suffer that loss if he can prevent it. There are, however, so many things that may happen; a train or bus may be missed; the alarm clock may not ring loud enough to waken an exhausted household; the wife or child may be very ill or the man may not be fit to face a heavy day; but that bonus shift is deducted without any mercy. Wartime food does not keep a man in the best condition for work and there are collieries where men have proved to have lost six pounds in weight during a shift. It is very true that many of my mates have come to work with little more than bread and often the slight

smear of margarine has been the wife's share. I work at a place which has that great boon—a pit head bath and canteen. Until recent weeks the canteen supplies have been chiefly a cup of tea with a promise of sugar and frequently no milk. Now we do get a number of meat pies. The men travel far from their homes and in some cases my mates have to ride quite twenty miles each way to work and have to pay the cost. Many of them have to leave their homes nearly two hours before they are due at the pit head. It often happens that the breakfast is a rushed meal as the housewife must get up before four o'clock to prepare it. After work is finished another two hours pass before the man or boy gets back to a fire and the chance of a warming meal. In such cases, and they number quite half the workers in this valley, there should surely be some method of giving a warm meal either before going in or before starting that long journey home—which is made even slower when winter makes the slopes difficult or an enemy 'plane drones overhead.

We know that the factories near us have good canteens and that they get cheap and ample meals. They work in pleasanter conditions than ours; surely we are worth at least the same consideration. At present we have to be grateful for the cakes and cigarettes they pass on to us when they board the buses which take us to and from work. It makes us think—and the conclusions are not pleasant.

SINGAPORE

I.

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

THOSE who designed the defences of Singapore have been accused of shutting their eyes to its real danger and of having spent immense sums on useless works and armament. Before coming to hasty conusions it is well to recall the purpose for which the great naval base was nstructed and the factors which affected its defence in circumstances which uld be foreseen, and in those which have actually arisen. The purpose of e base was of course to provide for the heaviest units of our Navy an erational centre from which our sea communications in Eastern waters uld be protected, and those of the enemy attacked. Singapore was in no nse a fortress intended to provide a pivot of manœuvre in the defence of alaya. The protection of the base itself, and, in fact, of all our Far Eastern ssessions, depended ultimately on naval action, for no serious danger could ise unless Japan secured undisputed control of sea communications in the ır East. It was realized that war with Japan would imply the temporary terruption of much of our eastern trade, especially with China, but Hong ong was the only one of our possessions that stood in serious danger so long we could despatch strong naval forces to the East and maintain at Singare a base from which they could operate.

The whole situation, however, depended on our ability to send an adequate rce to the East since, for strategical and economic reasons, we were unable maintain permanently in eastern waters a fleet comparable to that of Japan. ıe existence of the Singapore base, coupled with the possibility that in case war with Japan the U.S.A. might make common cause with Britain, obvisly exercised a deterrent influence on Japanese aggressive ambitions; but e fact that we did not normally maintain a powerful fleet in the East introced a time element of exceptional importance in the scheme of defence. naval bombardment and attack by carrier borne aircraft might have laid e installations of the Naval base in ruins before the arrival of the British eet; which would in consequence lose its operational power. That was e first danger to be guarded against, and it meant the installation of guns a power and range to keep the heaviest naval units at a distance and air fences to deal with carrier borne aircraft. A small permanent land rrison was also required to deal with raiding parties which might be

landed in the close vicinity of the port. Landings on a greater scale on the Malayan coast out of range of the local defences had also to be considered; but the proximity of India made it practicable to reinforce the normal garrison of Singapore during a state of tension; and since the operation of landing a large force, and its advance to positions from which it could damage the base, would take a considerable time, the defence problem was one of delaying action until the Fleet on its arrival could interrupt the sea communications of the force landed. The time factor therefore tended to rule out the probability of landings in the northern stretches of the Malayan coast with the intention of attacking the island from the mainland. The chief danger was that a force landed might establish shore air bases from which Singapore could be attacked without risking carriers. Provision was therefore made for the rapid reinforcement of the air defences by the establishment of a chain of landing grounds, and it should be noted that in estimating requirements that it would have been the enemy who would have suffered from the lack of alternative aerodromes during the early stages of invasion.

How far has this conception of the defence of Singapore justified itself and what unforeseen factors have vitiated it? To a considerable extent certainly it has been justified. Singapore has not been subjected to bombardment by naval guns or to attacks by carrier borne aircraft. It was possible to reinforce the garrison and air defences during the period of tension as was anticipated. Landings in the close vicinity of the port were not attempted, and the advance of enemy troops landed in northern Malaya has been delayed for a period far in excess of the time required for the arrival of the Fleet. The *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales* found the base ready for them and secure, and if it had been possible to despatch further elements of the Fleet to the East after the outbreak of war they would still have found it intact.

What vitiated the conception was primarily the fact that we could spare no adequate naval force to despatch to the East, and the Pearl Harbour disaster went far to eliminate the time factor from the Japanese problem, so far as Singapore was concerned.

Secondly the connivance of Vichy and Thailand presented Japan with ports at which troops and heavy equipment could be disembarked rapidly and with impunity, with air bases, and with a good and secure line of communication up to the Malayan frontier. To meet an attack through Thailand nothing short of a field army and air force commensurate with those of the invader would have sufficed for it was a question of defeating not merely delaying the enemy. Mr. Churchill has explained that we had neither such a force strategically available nor could we have spared the ships to transport it. The size of the defending force would have had to be all the greater, in view of the danger of its being attacked by troops landed in its rear under cover of both air and naval support. Malaya is approximately the size of England, and when one considers the size of the armies necessary for Home defence

one can get some idea of what was required in Malaya, making of course due allowance for the nature of the country and its communications as limiting factors on the numbers that could be engaged by both sides. Malaya had, however, the special weakness that it could be attacked both by land and from the sea under favourable conditions of secure communications.

It must be realized that it would have been no solution to have prepared the defences of Singapore as those of a fortress capable of standing siege, for once the enemy was established in such proximity to the fortress as would have imposed limitations on the size of the defending airforce and the number of its operational bases the value of the naval base would have been immensely reduced, if not altogether destroyed. The case of Malta where the value of the naval base is greatly reduced by the proximity of the enemy's air bases is analogous. In the absence of a fleet capable of operating against Japan's sea communications with Indo-China and with landings in Malaya, the presence of a large field army was essential. The force that was available would probably have sufficed to deal with attempts at landings, but when in addition the enemy was able to invade by land and with secure communications, immensely greater strength was needed to stop him. All experience in this war shows that an air force alone cannot stop the advance of an army, though of course its value in co-operation with the Army of Defence is immense. Powerful air reinforcements would have enabled the troops in Malaya to have delayed the enemy's advance much longer, but it is certainly questionable whether it would have stopped it altogether.

On the other hand, the strengthening of the air defences of Singapore alone would probably not have stopped, though it might have delayed, the enemy's advance. The situation called for the defeat of the enemy's army. Strong fortification of the approaches to Singapore Island from the land side, either on the mainland or on the perimeter of the island, might possibly have checked the enemy's final advance, but after failure to hold him at a distance would not have fulfilled the purpose of protecting the naval base from bombardment nor have secured room for effective air defence. To have provided such works in the original scheme would have added immensely to its already great capital cost, and would have entailed maintenance charges and a garrison of a size which in peace we could ill afford. What was done and what might have been done to convert Singapore into a fortress capable of standing siege, after the collapse of France had added so immensely to our naval commitments, and when Japan established a footing in Indo-China, is a different matter and one on which it is impossible to express opinion without full knowledge of all the local conditions. But under these unforeseen circumstances it is evident that the original project of providing a secure naval base entailed the employment of a strong field army and air force. Alexandria affords an analogous case; its security depends primarily on General Auchinleck's armies and associated air force, not on local fortification.

SINGAPORE

II.

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

SINGAPORE has fallen. It is the greatest disaster that we have suffered since the collapse of France, the most serious blow that has been struck not only at the British Empire but also at our allies, China and Russia. It paves the way to invasions of the British possessions in India and the Indian Seas. Australia and The Dutch Indies, the trade of India and the communications of the armies of the Empire, of Russia and of China, the supplies which pass through the Indian Ocean are threatened. The Burma Road can be cut as effectively at sea in the Bay of Bengal as in Burma or China. Japanese ambitions, now whetted with success, embrace the capture of every port in the Indian Ocean as far as Aden; and they will not stop there.

The immediate impulse in many minds is to find scapegoats for this grave disaster. The blame is variously thrown on the recent Commander-in-Chief; on the Administrations which, it is said, in the years before the war neglected to provide for an attack by land, their eyes being confined to the sea front; on those who rejected the advice of Lord Trenchard to confide the defence to the Air Force. Blame is thrown too on the present Ministers for failing to send reinforcements of land and air forces in adequate numbers, or to accompany the two battleships with aircraft. Australian critics complain that the Government in London, focussing its attention entirely on the security of Britain, has neglected the interests of the Empire in the South Pacific.

The Prime Minister has given his explanation of the reason why it was not considered possible to provide at the same time for the armies in Egypt, give Russia the aircraft and tanks and other munitions, of which she was in urgent need, and send reinforcements to Singapore. Whatever may be the right and the wrong in this matter, the real reason for the loss of Singapore lies further: and the persons and policy that are responsible for it are not far to seek. The persons are those Ministers who have directed the policy of our armaments for the last score of years; the Parliaments which have silently acquiesced in that policy; the Press which, with a few notable exceptions, has either supported the policy of reduction of British sea power or failed to point out the danger into which the folly and vanity of Ministers was leading the country; the successive Boards of Admiralty whose members, knowing (it must be presumed) the inadequacy of the provision that was being made,

and the erroneous strategical conceptions of the Ministers, kept silence and left the public to assume that their silence implied their concurrence. The public itself is not free from blame. Indifferent to the matter, and concerned with its own comforts and pleasures, it allowed the questions of national defence to be settled without enquiry. Nor are the Dominions without their share of censure. Ever since the first Colonial Conference in 1887, when the need for sharing the burden of the cost of Imperial defence was pointed out by Jan Hofmeyr, attention had been drawn to the need for the Dominions to take a proportionate share—proportionate either in terms of population, value of sea borne trade or some other criterion*—in the cost of the common defence, the maintenance of sea power which is the only possible form of security for our scattered Commonwealth of islands. The expenditure per head of population on the navy by the several Dominions and the United Kingdom was given by the late Lord Lothian (Round Table, November, 1910) for the financial year 1909-10 as follows:—United Kingdom 15s. 6d., Canada nil, Australia 1s. 6d., South Africa 1s. 6d., New Zealand 2s. 2½d., Newfoundland 3d. An increase in the Dominion contributions was agreed to in the Conference of 1909 but the disproportion still remained and has never been adjusted.

The fundamental reason for the loss of Singapore and the further losses that will follow is not the lack of local defence either in the present war or in the past preparations. Errors there may have been. It may well be—on this I can offer no opinion—that the defence could have been prolonged if the land and air defences had been differently arranged and in greater strength. But no fortress in the whole history of warfare that is isolated has ever survived. Unless there were sea power to bring relief, drive off the attacker at sea, and cut the communications of the forces he had landed for the siege, the place was bound to fall. The British and Dominion Governments which had failed to maintain a navy adequate to its responsibilities, which set aside the teachings of history and the eternal lesson that the security of such an Empire as ours depends on sea power, are the real authors of the disaster. Everyone knows the advice of the old Trimmer, Halifax, that the Englishman must look to his moat; the "moat" was the Channel and the North Sea; to-day it is all the Oceans. The first Lord Stanhope wisely advised in 1715 against trusting to other arms than our own for our security, well aware of the uncertainty of alliances. Burke reminded his countrymen of the danger of tampering with the Navy.

> Of all the public services that of the Navy is the one in which tampering may be of the greatest danger, which can worst be supplied upon an emergency, and of which any failure draws after it the longest and heaviest train of consequences.†

What prophetic words!

There has indeed been no lack of writers to remind us of the fact that we stand or fall by sea power. "'Keep the command of the sea,' wrote Admiral

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* cf. Lionel Curtis in *Action*. Oxford University Press. 9d.

†*On the present state of the Nation*, 1769.

Colomb in 1889, 'as you value your national life; without it you will speedily be blotted out from the list of great nations.'" Nor, is it only by the maintenance of the navy at a proper strength that is necessary for salvation. The national strategy must first and foremost have as its object the attainment of command of the sea. So the great thinker Colonel G. F. R. Henderson enunciated the doctrine that the first duty of the British army is to assist the navy to obtain command of the sea.

These doctrines have been flouted, and it is because they have been flouted, not because the local defences of Singapore were inadequate in strength and unapt in type, that Singapore has been lost. Gibraltar was saved in its first siege in 1704-5 because sea power in the shape of Leake's fleet twice sailed into the Bay and dispersed the enemy fleet on which the investing army depended, and in its second long three-years siege by the three reliefs brought to it by Rodney, Darby and Howe.

Though the disablement of the American fleet is the immediate cause of the lack of allied command which has resulted in the loss of Singapore, the Philippines and the Dutch islands, it is idle to lay the blame on that event. This country, as Lord Stanhope had said, should rely upon itself alone for its security. It never could be foretold with that certainty that a question of this importance demands that the United States would either be attacked by Japan or would, if she was not attacked, come to the help of the Commonwealth to preserve its possessions and guard the Dominions in Australasia. To depend upon either of these events would be the height of folly, equalled only by the folly of not providing adequately for the command of the sea in a two-ocean war. For a two-ocean war was a possibility after Japan had set her feet upon a course of aggression and the twin dictators were beginning their careers of crime. No one could reasonably expect that if war should break out with Japan, it would be possible to send the whole fleet of Britain to the Far East: and less than the whole would not be enough. The temptation to our late enemies and the land-grabber of Rome to seize the opportunity to attack us in Europe if we had sent the whole fleet away was one to which no one could be blind: and, as the danger in Europe grew continually nearer with the rearmament of Germany, and the several acts of aggression by her and by Italy, Australia became anxious. England's difficulty would be Japan's opportunity, and Australian writers drew attention to the gravity of the situation that would then confront her.* The remedy that was suggested in Australia was local defence by submarines, destroyers, mines and aircraft. The utter inadequacy of local defence, the impossibility that it could replace a defence arising from the command of the sea, was not realized by these writers any more than the need for a two-ocean navy was realized by the successions of British Governments which tampered (to use Burke's expression) with the Navy.

* *Japan and the defence of Australia* by "Albatross"; *Australia and War to-day* by the Right Hon. W. M. Hughes, 1936.

Lord Jellicoe had seen clearly the need. When he made his world cruise with the object of discussing the problem of Imperial defence with the ministers of the several Dominions, he had recommended the creation of an Eastern Fleet of 16 capital ships with the proper proportion of cruisers and flotilla craft, and the building of a base at Singapore, the cost to be borne by the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in the proportions of 75, 20 and 5 per cent. respectively. The proposal expressed recognition of the true fundamental principles that the defence of the Empire depends on sea power and is the joint concern and responsibility of all its members. But it did not find support either in this country or in the Dominions except in so far as the building of the base was concerned, and that was undertaken at the cost of the United Kingdom. A base was a very necessary thing, but a base without a fleet is no more use than a sentry box without a sentry.

While it is this deplorable failure to maintain our sea power that is principally responsible for the tragic sacrifice and the consequent peril, two other causes have contributed to the present situation. One is, as remarked earlier, the destruction of the naval Air Arm which has deprived the Navy of an essential element of its flotilla strength, the other is the abandonment of that strategical principle expressed by Colonel Henderson. What Henderson said about the first duty of the army is applicable also to the Air Force. The first need of the Empire is the command of the sea. The doctrine of strategy widely preached in that arm has been that the hitherto accepted principles of war do not apply to the air, and that, whereas in the other two arms the primary object in grand strategy is to obtain command of the sea, and the course of action by which to attain it is the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy, the Air Force is an independent body which, operating on its own account, aims its blows directly at the two objectives of the will of the enemy people and the establishments of production supply and internal life in general. Engaged upon the activities in these directions there has been too little to spare for those operations overseas affecting the command of the sea. It may well be asked whether the bombs dropped, during the two months since Japan delivered her felon stroke on Pearl Harbour and began her invasions of the British, Dutch and American islands, have been as fruitfully used as they would have been if that flexibility which we are told is so important and invaluable a quality of the Air Arm had been exploited by the transfer of some of this bomb dropping force to the Far East to assist in maintaining the command of the sea and the defence of those possessions. Let us hope that it is still not too late to return to the old principles and employ our forces in co-operation with the object of regaining what the errors of policy in the past and strategy in the present have cost us and our allies; and that this will be done before injury can be inflicted on the communications of the allied armies in Egypt, Persia, Russia and China.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By Stephen Gwynn

IT seems agreed that book-buying is active at present; all the sadder for those to whom paper shortage denies the chance to profit by this unusual phenomenon. Probably the sight of a shop where unrestricted purchase is possible acts as a stimulus, and in certain cases the taste for reading may in this way be casually implanted. Lucky, if so, the implantee; books are the mind's best tonic for what all minds have now to face; they are also the happy diversion to other thoughts. I am glad to see that the Pen Club applies itself to meeting this need; a shower of little P.E.N. Books reaches me, all published by Allen & Unwin at the modest price of two shillings, and all under the general editorship of Mr. Herman Ould. Chief among the five is one in which the Club's President, Miss Storm Jameson, applies her vigorous talent to helping minds bogged in perplexity. Writing on *The End of this War*, she sets out by quoting the reported observation of a healthy fourteen-year old boy "that at least he had three more years before he would probably be killed in battle." There is a question implied; as she says, "the boy ought to be answered," and her answer, why this must be asked of him and others, is such that one could not ask it better given. Having known Czechoslovakia well, she knows what the New Order has meant to it; she knows and shows what it has meant in Poland. We must accept either war or the destruction of the civilization which many generations in many countries have built up under the central influence of Christianity. To the Pacifist who says: "Even so, war is not worth the cost," she nobly replies that "no one has the right to hand over unborn generations into slavery." But I differ from her in thinking it impossible to give the boy an answer which would satisfy him. She has allowed herself—like so many—to be talked into a belief that the word "war" always means the same thing. Up to a point it does; so does "man"; yet man and man differ considerably in quality. War is and always has been a characteristic human activity and by no means only or wholly an evil one.

Five Little Books

It should be said to such a boy: "Yes, you may probably have to face your chance of being killed, but you have a more likely chance to survive with honour. In that case you will have gained experience that nothing else can give you; you will know yourself and other men—your own reactions and theirs in danger. You may have learnt what it is to command; you will almost certainly have learnt what it is to be well commanded. But, above all, you will have known comradeship as no ordinary way in life can give it you."

* * * * *

For my own part I should be prepared to say to such a boy—or to the

President of the P.E.N. Club—that after a life prolonged past the allotted span, in which there has been considerable variety of experience, no passage has enriched me more than the two years spent in military service. Edmund Blunden's *Undertones of War* (happily accessible in the 'Penguin' Series) revived many memories for me; yet he, being of the normal age for company officers, as I was not, had far more than ever I had of this comradeship actually in trenches. That came to me later, in friendships made with men of my own age, when the casual tie was something different (fishing, generally), but the essential bond was our common experience of war; and no other friendships of all my life were so satisfying. Outside of these closer intimacies was the general bond with others who had served—how far-spreading! Add to this what Blunden's book gives admirably, the feeling, unlike anything else I have known, towards a battalion commander who has the power to inspire it. These are chances of experience which make the adventure worth while; and it is a great adventure. We have no right to tell a boy that he will be called to take his part in something disgraceful. On the contrary. It is a privilege to serve, and has been, even if death closes it.

Comradeship and War

There has been in this war, I think, nothing so disgusting and so wasteful of life as trench warfare was; and I am not sure but that the virtues acquired in the last war have reappeared throughout the whole people. At all events the Catholic Archbishop of Birmingham, who was once an army chaplain, holds that opinion; he is reported in the *Universe* of January 30, as saying:

> The finest comradeship I have ever seen was that during the last war amongst the men who shared the hardships and dangers of the trenches. That sort of comradeship has during this war extended to hundreds of thousands of civilians. We become wonderfully kind to one another when each of us knows that it may be his or her turn next to suffer from the next bombing.
>
> It has taken the common danger of a horrible war to produce this fine fellowship. But can't we manage to keep it after the war, even when the danger has passed? It is the real brotherhood of man, and it ought to exist in all man's activities especially in industry. There is no reason from the nature of things why only those who provide the capital should control an industry, and not share control with those who provide the labour.

Here, assuredly, Miss Jameson will agree—unless she is too violently committed against the whole principle of profit-making and profit-taking. Her anger with our society leads her to extravagantly denouncing "the England of doles, distressed areas and slums." "Dole" is a question-begging word. And I would ask her to remember that humanity has various gifts and one of them is the gift of profit-making—a special aptitude like the artist's, and not less creditable. Many of us are learning to be thankful for a shop-keeper who can give us good service in difficult conditions. To put it higher, I have known two men who had the gift and who made fortunes—one in the heart of London. He spent like one of the mediæval merchants; not only that, but found time to earn a name as one of the best writers of his time; I speak of that delightful essayist F. S. Oliver. The other lived in an old city not far removed from the mediæval type; but Martin McDonogh, the Galway merchant, owned much machinery, and bought always the best that could be had; just as he did when he bought cattle, or the racehorses that were his pride. A rough giant of a man, he had no graces of speech, but when he died, I heard again and again in the crowd at his funeral: "No one will ever know all the good that man did." All his dealings were personal, and

had that element of comradeship which exists between the good colonel and his men.

It may well be that our salvation lies in developing and preserving this virtue which war certainly can foster, at least I am sure that our failure after the last war was first and chiefly a failure in comradeship. The French, who had borne the worst of it, asked a joint guarantee for the future from the United States and Great Britain. America refused, and Britain, the older and closer comrade, refused to face the undertaking alone—not so much from "craven fear of being great," as from lack of the impulse which bids comrades share all, to the last crust and the last cartridge. Who doubts now but it was a mistake, even in prudence?

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Post-War Poets

At all events, Miss Storm Jameson, chosen head of the associated writers who group themselves in the P.E.N. Club, speaks her mind generously and with insight on the central preoccupations of this hour. Mr. Richard Church in *Plato's Mistake* devotes another of these volumes to considering his own particular anxiety. If after winning the war we create a New Order of our own (which Miss Jameson thinks necessary), how are the artists to be dealt with? And more particularly the poets? Speaking as one who is a poet and has been a civil servant, he is very much afraid that the Civil Service will be put in charge. The artist—and more particularly the poet—is prone to think for himself and make his own music; now, Plato in the *Republic*, says that any such person "who will not say what he says according to those models which are established by law at first" must be put (politely, but firmly) out of the city. The State may possibly and even probably find work for painters, sculptors and architects: it may even think it desirable to provide sustenance for musicians; but as to poets, if they want to go their own wild way, they must go it at their own expense; and Mr. Church does not believe that even the best of them will get a living by it. Nor does he share the general view that poetry is an occupation which can be well fitted in with some other; he quotes Yeats in support of his own view that it should be a whole-time job. Yet it was not so with Burns, who has a strong claim to be considered the most popular poet that ever lived, and the one who meant most to his native country (Shakespeare, being a dramatist, is in another category). Mr. Church does not reach any positive conclusion (except indeed that the Civil Service must be kept out of it); but then his purpose is to be provocative, or, as he says, a little impertinent. He allows that poets manage to get published—but only by publishers who hope that some day they may write a novel.

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Hardy and Synge

Henry Nevinson, in yet another of these volumes, writes of *Thomas Hardy*—a great storyteller (he disliked the name "novelist") who valued himself chiefly as a poet, and would by choice have written nothing but verse. I am unable to regret that this wish was not granted. Yet after reading Nevinson's account of him, it is impossible not to sympathize in all ways with one whom the sketch presents as so lovable—and with such vividness. A phrase of old slang which I have not seen or heard for long years comes to my pen: Nevinson was (alas, for "was") a great swell. I seem to remember Maurice Hewlett (who was a great swell too) using the expression when he wanted to convey achieve-

nents like those of the cricketer who makes a lot of runs and makes them with a style that has distinction in every stroke.

Mr. L. A. G. Strong writes of another genius, like Hardy's deeply seared with unhappiness, and, even more than Hardy's stamped with poetic character, though its finest work was in prose. *John Millington Synge* is the best appraisement of Ireland's best dramatist that I have ever seen; the kind of criticism which could only come from a poet, and yet has a mastery of critical technique which few poets ever acquire. It is curious how much literature at large owes to what was called the Gælic revival but is now seen to have been a broadening of the domain possessed by poetry in the English tongue. Because that is seen, Synge and Yeats are less in favour than they were with all the Ireland that desires to think and speak of itself as Gælic.

* * * * *

The Welsh Language

There is a singular difference between it and the other nation about which Mr. Wyn Griffith writes (still in the same series) his *Word from Wales.* If distinctness of language is the test of nationality, as Gælic Leaguers hold, then Wales is far more a nation than Ireland; it has 800,000 Welsh speakers in a population of two million against an alleged 500,000 in Eire's three millions, and I do not myself believe that more than a quarter of a million in Ireland habitually use Irish. It would be impossible to find happening anywhere in Ireland what I met when I was brought down to speak on Home Rule in the district where Mr. Lloyd George grew up. Before I was called on, the local member, the local county councillors, all the leading Liberals of the neighbourhood, discussed Mr. Lloyd George's Insurance Act without a word of English, or a thought of using English. After an hour of this, it was only natural that, as a demonstration, I should start with a few sentences in Gælic, which puzzled them; then they began to laugh, and I said we were even now—and went on in English. But my demonstration was only formal. I only knew one Irish Nationalist at Westminister who could have discussed technicalities in Irish, and it would not have come natural to him to do so. I doubt if there has been more than one man in the Dublin Dáil really qualified to pass such a test.

Naturally I have read with great interest the way in which Wales educated itself in the literate use of its own tongue; for of course the English authorities could not be expected to help. The spread of nonconformist religion helped the language and zeal for the language helped nonconformist religion. But Mr. Wyn Griffiths holds that the chapel is now "no longer the true centre of communal life," and he calls on the Welsh writers to give a lead, free from the shackles of a constricted Puritanism. For Wales he believes that the Welsh language is an invaluable instrument of culture, of which English educational authorities should endeavour to promote the use. If they do, I should say from what I have seen in Ireland that one result will be to enrich English literature with a new strain; and a language so strong and vital need not fear competing attractions—which in any event must exist. The problem is to develop interaction and not repugnancy. Happily in Wales this is not made more difficult by inherited resentments.

THOMAS HARDY, by Edmund Blunden. English Men of Letters. *Macmillan. 7s. 6d.*

Membership in a series inevitably imposes limitations on any book, or at least supplies a standard skeletal structure, for the book must, to keep faith, satisfy the expectations which the series label excites. Searching my own experience for the time and state of mind when the English Men of Letters series was most useful, I concluded that the audience addressed was either the senior High School student or the general reader who wished to tread the realms of literature in the confidence provided by a well-informed guide. Occasionally the guide's exposition might be so brilliant as to illuminate thickets hitherto obscure, and it would then attract other guides; but it would be addressed primarily to the newcomer, and would aim at making him familiar with the main topographical features, so that he would not lose his way. Mr. Blunden's readers would expect to learn, that is, what tract of ground Hardy's work occupies, the kind of ground it is and its situation in respect to that of other contemporary writers and to English literature as a whole. Unfortunately none of these expectations seems to me to be adequately fulfilled by Mr. Blunden's work. A reader who knows not Hardy will gain a very odd notion of him from its curiously selected detail, may indeed wonder why Hardy is considered worthy of inclusion in the series at all, while those who know Hardy's work well will be exasperated by Mr. Blunden's omissions and misapprehensions, and enraged by his timid patronage of a great master. Is it really necessary, for instance, at this stage to state that one "cannot agree with Mr. Chesterton's attacks upon (Hardy) as one with a soured and dangerous mind gloating over the bad"? "Almost any habitué of literature," Mr. Blunden tells us earlier, "could apparently lend (Hardy) a hand and improve the appeal of his genius by judicious retrenchments. Much might be done, but some caution would be required . . ." "Some" seems a trifle ungenerous in this connection.

The truth is that Mr. Blunden has laboured under two great difficulties. The first is that, a very great deal having already been written about Hardy, Mr. Blunden, perhaps from a mistaken view of his audience, has desired to avoid writing it again. Accordingly he both omits much that should have been said, and includes much that need not. He gives very little place to Hardy's regionalism, and never attempts to indicate the characteristic features of the Hardy plot structure; while most of Hardy's finest characters are never mentioned at all! No novice would have any notion of the content and quality of, for example, *The Return of the Native*, *The Woodlanders* and *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, after reading this book. On the other hand Mr. Blunden goes into tedious detail about Hardy's contributions to minor war charities, devotes ten pages to a scathing analysis of a minor novel like *A Pair of Blue Eyes*, and quotes endlessly—but *endlessly*—from minor Victorian reviewers.

The other great difficulty is that Mr. Blunden has not clarified, either for himself or his readers, Hardy's view of the universe. Hardy regards the First Cause, the Immanent Will, or whatever, as concerned solely to produce "eternal artistries in Circumstance"; to the human joy or sorrow produced by these artistries it is indifferent, because unconscious of them; and human attempts at individual choice or action, such as, for example, marry-

ng one person rather than another, eave It completely cold. Man's truggle to achieve individual vishes is therefore a piece of sub- ime foolishness, sublime because so oolish; it may succeed or it may iot, the Will does not care either way. Once this fundamental idea s grasped, all Hardy's work is per- eived to be a magnificent whole, inked by its philosophic content, to which he offers Wessex or Napole- onic illustrations. His fictions are ontinually, though doubtless at irst unconsciously, founded upon he unlikelihood of feeling and inci- lent working together favourably o any individual plan; *The Dynasts* eveals, on a huge scale, how the Will pushes men here and there vithout regard to their private ongings; the poems often record he emotions of humanity in this arlous situation. Leaving this 'figure in the carpet" of Hardy's works untraced, Mr. Blunden is apt o present their details as separate ntities, when indeed, lacking the upport of their context, their basic lesign, they appear distorted and neaningless.

There is one aspect of this study, owever, for which every reader, ovice or specialist, may be sin- erely grateful. Mr. Blunden is a oet, and his every reference to Hardy's poetry shows the expert; here are no quotations here from ther people's reviews, everything s fresh, sound and revealing. The nalysis of Hardy's "restless, ur- ent, emphatic" beat and its cause, nd the comparison with other Victorian prosodies, give particular leasure.

No work by a writer of Mr. Blun- len's quality can altogether lack eauties, but if I regard his study f Hardy as he regards Hardy's ovels, namely as a mixture of 'faded pages" and "elements of achievement," it is because he him- self has provided both the phrases and their relative emphasis.

PHYLLIS BENTLEY.

THE FUTURE OF NATIONS: Independence or Interdepend- ence? by E. H. Carr. *Kegan Paul.* 1*s.*

DEMOCRACY — THE THREAT- ENED FOUNDATIONS, by Reginald Lennard. *Cambridge University Press.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

THE FOUNDATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATION- AL LAW, by P. H. Winfield. *Cambridge University Press.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

HITLER'S REICH AND CHURCHILL'S BRITAIN, by Stephen Laird & Walter Graebner, *Batsford.* 6*s.*

No thinking person will contest the truth of Sir Stafford Cripps' assertion that, by comparison with the people of Soviet Russia, we who profess and call ourselves demo- crats are lacking in a sense of urgency about the war and that this relative apathy will endure and will continue to stultify our war effort until "the public knows what it is fighting for in a positive way." That is the justification of the out- crop of slim volumes since the war began, designed to limn the features of "the democratic order"—the title of the series edited by Francis Williams to which Professor Carr's little study belongs. Unfortunately the English public does not take kindly to ideas and "problems," so that this necessary education of democracy for democracy is an up- hill task. A certain donnish quality characterizing the "Current Prob- lems" offerings of the Cambridge University Press will, one fears, put most people off. However, these weaker vessels have the soft option of the Batsford book record- ing a straightforward conversation

by two American correspondents speaking from first-hand experience, from which they will get a certain amount of mental nourishment.

Mr. Lennard, actually, has done a useful job of clarification. His book as a whole lacks unity and reads more like a series of disconnected chapters, but he manages to explain the essence of what is meant when men speak of England as a democracy, despite the manifold superficial features of our society that would seem to deny it. Confining himself, perhaps wisely, to our island story he depicts the gradual growth of conventions and institutions which has produced a core of democratic faith accepted, consciously or unconsciously, by almost all of us; and in a final chapter he chides the impatient reformers with an array of facts and statistics showing the measure of social progress that has been effected even in one generation. A section discoursing on "the Temple of Moloch" provides the opportunity for an illuminating contrast with the totalitarian termite-State, and the author brings out well "the unique quality of the individual self-consciousness" from which alone springs the impulse to the good life.

Professor Winfield's book can hardly be said to contribute much in the way of light and leading. It is a wholly conventional primer of that most jejune of academic subjects—'International Law,' pedestrian in manner and substance, contrasting unfavourably with that little masterpiece of compression on the same subject by Professor Brierley of Oxford. The author accepts uncritically, for instance, the meaningless gloss on the League of Nations Covenant which allowed the idea to grow up that economic "sanctions," divorced from military measures, could ever be an effective means of war-prevention.

Mr. Walter Graebner, correspondent for *Time* in London has been through our ordeal by bombing with us and evidently understands very well the "sort of people we are." Incidentally, he is sensible, and not merely adulatory, about Mr. Churchill, bringing out well his qualities and his limitations and mentioning the undertow of criticism of the Premier's relative neglect of domestic problems. But the main interest of the book is, of course, the picture of the *Reich* in wartime contributed by his colleague (who was in Berlin up till last June). Mr. Laird tells us little that is new to those who have read *Berlin Diary* or the recent book by Mr. Harsch. But we cannot be reminded too often that, whatever cause for grumbling they may have, the Germans have derived from Hitler and the Nazi régime a feeling of *security* such as they never knew before; that the nation is united behind Hitler in a negative sense—the Germans are "immensely afraid of losing the war" and

> if they overthrow the régime they lose the war. If they win the war the Hitler régime can probably not be overthrown.

That seems to sum up the situation pretty well. He makes the point that Nazi domination of the world as conceived by Hitler (and the Army and industrialists who pull the strings) does not necessarily entail German rule everywhere but only a constellation of compliant "homespun fascisms in other countries" as a result of Axis military victories.

Professor Carr's little shillingsworth, though certainly a think-piece, is pure gold. He has a rare capacity for getting behind the labels of words to the essence of things. He shows us where the peacemakers of 1919 went wrong by their failure to distinguish between 'State' and 'nation,' so that "self-

determination," which indeed is implicit in the idea of democracy, was seen exclusively in the 19th century setting of political rights without due consideration of military and economic exigencies: men may "determine" themselves, after all, into larger as readily as into smaller units. Henceforth, for the sake of international order, we must not merely lay more stress on the obligations, as against the rights, of nations but also accept that the State-units, which form the political context of the nations' life, are required "to subordinate military and economic policy and resources to the needs of a wider community." This 'goes for' Great Powers as well as the small States. At the same time it is no use expecting a tidy international polity to be set up when this war is over; it will be a question of proceeding empirically "on the basis of the power available to make co-operation effective and of the will to use that power." No elaborate constitutional vestments but adaptation of the existing inter-allied military and economic war councils to the needs of peace.

W. Horsfall Carter.

GERMANY'S FIRST EUROPEAN PROTECTORATE, by Eugene V. Erdely. *Robert Hale.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

BALKAN RACKET, by C. F. Melville. *Jarrolds.* 2*s.* 6*d.*

UNDER THE IRON HEEL, by Lars Moen. *Robert Hale.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Three different authors, three different books, but the subject is the same—and so is the conclusion. Dr. Erdely's most impressive *Germany's First European Protectorate* deals with the murder of the Czechoslovak Republic, "a democratic State in which legal security and public order protected the citizens against any abuse of authority." On the basis of facts, figures and documentary evidence the author comes to the conclusion "that the actual losses in goods and money alone inflicted on the Czechs without waging war were much higher in proportion than those incurred by the Germans under the Versailles Treaty after four and a half years of war." This should be noted by those who regard Versailles as the root of all evil; and it is further worth recalling that the Treaty dictated by the Germans at Brest Litovsk was far more ruthless than the Treaty of Versailles. In order to make the German terror against the Czech people comprehensible, Dr. Erdely goes as far back as Tacitus, yet these crimes continue to defeat the human imagination, even though, as the author says, terrorism "occupies a prominent and honourable position in the armoury of German political weapons." Every crime committed by a German against a Czech is *a priori* excused by some paragraph of a German decree—which goes to confirm that the 7½ million Czechs are not citizens of a "Protectorate," but hostages of a savage enemy. The resistance of the Czech people is all the more wonderful. Dr. Erdely's book makes one painfully aware what a tragedy it is for the whole of humanity that the country that was once ruled by the voice of the great and noble philosopher Masaryk, should now be ruled by the voice of a creature of Himmler's.

Mr. C. F. Melville in his book, *Balkan Racket,* displays a knowledge of Continental conditions for which even Continental journalists and historians might well envy him. He not only records facts, which he says is a journalist's job; he writes history. The fact that much of it is based on personal experience only adds to the interest of his book. The description of the political back-

ground of the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in 1934 reads like a thrilling novel. The portrait of the Regent, Prince Paul, is a masterpiece of psychological delineation. From the facts produced by Mr. Melville it is clear beyond all doubt that the real murderer of King Alexander was Mussolini, but it is also clear why the Hitler-Mussolini alliance was inevitable. Ignorance, or incorrect evaluation, of these facts rendered possible the marauding expedition to Abyssinia, led to the abandonment of Austria to Hitler and the destruction of Czechoslovakia and, finally, the present war. There is a straight line leading from the assassination of King Alexander to the outbreak of the present war.

Mr. Lars Moen, the author of *Under the Iron Heel*, travelled through occupied Belgium and Holland with open eyes and a receptive heart. He, like Dr. Erdely and Mr. Melville, gives only facts. In this connection he writes: "It seemed to me that the cruelty and cold barbarity of the truth made superfluous any embroidering of the facts." Coming from Mr. Moen, this conclusion has special weight, for he viewed everything with the objectivity of a scientist, which he is. His statement that the Belgians and Dutch would rather starve than allow Hitler to be strengthened through consignments of food to themselves, and his further statement that the excessive demand for goods on the part of the occupying troops is due to fear of a fresh inflation, are both worth noting. Our three authors—a Czechoslovak, a Briton and an American—all prove through facts the enormity of the German "New Order" in Europe. The brow of the German people is branded with the brand of Cain.

E. MULLER-STURMHEIM.

RECONSTRUCTION AND THE LAND, by Sir Daniel Hall. *Macmillan.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

As a pioneer at the Rothamsted Experimental Station and author of *The Soil*, Sir Daniel Hall is known to all agriculturalists. In the book under review he has faced up to the formidable agrarian siuation, stated it in broad and detailed terms, and advanced a solution.

The situation is roughly as follows. Farming has been declining in Great Britain for the last seventy years, a decline accelerating during the last twenty. The area under cultivation and the number of men employed has continuously shrunk. The condition of the land has declined, the equipment has not been kept up, the landlords have been unwilling or unable to spend enough capital on the land, with the result that the State has had to step in. It has been found necessary to assist agriculture by a system of subsidies and duties on imports which amount to a considerable burden on the taxpayer. These bounties do not call out reciprocal duties from farmers nor involve any fundamental reconstruction of the industry. It has become clear that the farming structure is out of date and requires a total reconstruction to meet the needs of the new farming with its enlarged powers and resources. And for this reconditioning of the whole fabric the landlords are not prepared. Hence the conclusion is reached that the state is the only agency that can carry out this necessary adaptation of the land to the new conditions. To do so and get repaid for its expenditure the State must become the owner of the land.

That conclusion reached, Sir Daniel Hall outlines how the State will take over—how purchase, how administer, how allocate larger and more economic units, and so on.

He does not fail to review in passing the various other schemes and the objections which have been put forward as against the solution he advances. In short, the reader will find here a very elaborate scheme of reconstruction.

It is a book which has already met with widespread approval and widespread dismay. The approval comes chiefly from the most powerful quarters, the industrialists, the financiers, the business economists. The dismay comes from those who regard farming as an integrated whole, whose viewpoint is not from the angle of cash and profit but of ultimate soil fertility and human well-being. This latter school of thought holds that the huge mechanical farms as opposed to the smaller units that can balance a good mixed production, will lead to the impoverishment of the soil, and that the very lands such as America, Australia, and the Argentine which show the lowest figures of returns per acre, are, by the Sir Daniel Hall scheme, to be copied instead of those which show the highest figures such as Holland and Belgium. And from the social and spiritual point of view it is felt that the scheme will make farms into factories.

The present reviewer does not feel himself as yet qualified to take sides in this enormously complicated matter. But it is clear that Sir Daniel Hall's frame of mind is that of Big Business, and that for him the Taxpayer and Consumer is a special kind of person and not to be found on the land, while Rent, Prices, and Money are things to which man must kow-tow. His attitude is unconsciously revealed in one remarkable sentence. In a very short and not too sympathetic account of the history of agriculture in this country he speaks of what he calls the heyday of British agriculture in the sixties of last century. "That was the golden age" he writes, "to which men looked back when I was a young man, wheat at 50s. and wages at 12s. a week, a sack of wheat to pay two weeks wages." That is a very curious remark. It might pass at an unreported after-dinner speech to fellow businessmen, but it makes a strange appearance in a volume purporting to speak in the *national* interest.

JOHN STEWART COLLIS.

THE PRUSSIAN SPIRIT, by S. D. Stirk. *Faber & Faber.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

TREITSCHKE'S ORIGINS OF PRUSSIANISM. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. *Allen & Unwin.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

Mr. Stirk's survey of German literature and politics between 1914 and 1940 is, the author reminds us in his preface, intended as a "war-book" but in the sense of being "primarily concerned with ideas and with the broad battles of spiritual and intellectual forces." In other words while showing that Hitlerism is fundamentally a continuation of Prussianism, this book is not made-to-measure propaganda, providing easy ammunition for potting the fabulous Hun of the hasty leaderwriter's imagination. Yet it *is* a war book, for it surveys the portents of Weimar and Potsdam in the light of the menace to world peace of Prussian militarism.

The author sets himself out to assess the merits and demerits of Prussianism but he scouts the easy device of contrasting a brutal and Spartan Prussia with a supposedly peaceful other Germany. The Prussian spirit, in that sense, has been claimed by Germans with no lineal Prussian heritage. Even the most ardent devotees of the pre-Nazi Weimar Republic felt it hard to resist the call to discipline and self-sacrifice which—the author pertinently reminds us—means immolation before the State and suppression

of the liberties of other nations when it comes to the test of war.

That conflict of impulses was exemplified by Thomas Mann, despite the fact that he has been disowned by Nazi propagandists since he left the *Reich*. In *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* published towards the end of the last war he pictured with scorn the sort of Europe which would arise from the "pacifist, virtuous, republican, bourgeois demagogy" of the French Revolution in other words, from the victory of Western democracy: "a little ridiculous, a little platitudinously humanitarian, trivial and demoralized, with a feminine elegance . . . a Europe of big business and pleasure, literary in the sense in which a Parisian prostitute is literary. . ." Although in this is perceptible a shrill note of hysteria, testifying to the schizophrenic conflict within the German character, there is just a sufficient element of truth in the indictment to make us pause before asserting that all is well with Western democracy. Pertinent too, is Mr. Stirk's analysis of Oswald Spengler and his worship of Prussian Socialism. Spengler identified Pietism with Prussianism approvingly and asserted that Puritanism was its English antithesis. From Calvinism and the idea of predestination the English had derived their self-confidence and lack of conscience in action! Spengler's generalizations reveal a rankling sense of resentment at British success and an unconscious desire to emulate the ruthlessness with which he credits our imperialism. But, as the author reminds us, such fearless critics of Nazi abuses as the novelist Ernst Wiechert and the Protestant pastor Martin Niemöller, both now in concentration camps, are also Prussians.

Mr. Stirk, a Yorkshireman who studied at a German University and lived many years in the *Reich*, is concerned not merely to indict Prussianism but to indicate what he calls "The Prussian dilemma" and how it may be utilized by Britain. He is not content to reply "Prussia is the culprit" to the usual question: "How is it possible that in the land of Goethe, Kant and Schopenhauer barbarism should again and again raise its head?" He traces the cult of the Prussian spirit via Frederick the Great, Moeller van den Bruck and Alfred Rosenberg and shows how the philosophic ideas of Fichte and Kant have been exploited to this end. Of particular interest is his account of the writings of Ernst Jünger, exponent of "Western Front Socialism." In Jünger one seems to detect distaste for the demagogic Hitler on the part of an admittedly militaristic but patrician mind. How far that Prussian contempt for the opportunist Nazi politician can be utilized is a problem of undoubted interest. A similar dislike of Nazi demagogy could be discerned in Ernst Niekisch who long advocated Germano-Russian co-operation in opposition to the operation in opposition to the Versailles Treaty. Niekisch's periodical *Widerstand* which enjoyed a somewhat surreptitious vogue amongst young Left wing Nazis in the early years of the Régime was however suppressed and Niekisch himself was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment *pour encourager les autres!* Hitler, it appears, is aware of the "Prussian dilemma." Mr. Stirk's book, is, however, one which deserves attention at the present time.

Eden and Cedar Paul have produced an excellent translation of Heinrich von Treitschke's candid study of the colonization of Old Prussia by the Teutonic Knights, *Das deutsche Ordensland Preussen* written and published in 1862. Published for the first time in English, it provides a striking example of

the writer's early work and as a candid exposition of ideas glorified as the apotheosis of Prussianism it serves as a useful pendant to his better known book: *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century.*

BERNARD CAUSTON.

THE GERMAN NEW ORDER IN POLAND, published for the Polish Ministry of Information by *Hutchinson.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

RETRIBUTION, by Gerald Abrahams. *Allen.* 6*s.*

In the summer of 1918 some 6,000 Italian prisoners of war were at Knin in Dalmatia; dozens had died on the way, others while they were being got out of the station, for they had been bestially maltreated by the Magyars. They were nothing but skeletons, dressed almost exclusively in paper clothes; and when a doctor of my acquaintance reported their condition to General Wucherer of the Austro-Hungarian army, this general, a decent fellow, ordered the doctor to dictate the whole affair and said that if necessary he would take the matter direct to His Majesty the Emperor Charles. Then in the presence of his staff he exclaimed: '*Wir sind doch die grossten Schuften!*' ('After all it is we who are the biggest scoundrels!') What would this humane man have said if he had lived to hear of the treatment accorded by his German allies to the population of Poland?

This book, with its horrifying illustrations, has opened the eyes of the world to the necessity of dealing with the Germans in no uncertain manner after this war. If it had not been for actual photographs of murdering and of the most ferocious proclamations no civilized person would have believed that a people calling itself human, let alone a *Herrenvolk,* could act in such a fashion. In the most methodical

Out in all weathers . . . tanned, healthy and enjoying life, instead of long, tiring, airless hours in a restaurant . . . *She's* one of the people who may no longer need

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manner it had been determined that the Polish nation was to be destroyed and a start was made with the intellectual class, so that there should be no leaders left. Of course the Germans have failed to work their evil will and when they have to face the new Polish armies which are being prepared on the Russian front they will indeed be wishing that they had behaved differently.

One scarcely knows where to begin in this catalogue of diabolical outrages against all that has been accepted for centuries between the nations of Europe, and, by the way, it demonstrates once and for all that no inch of African soil must be restored to a people so utterly incapable of ruling over another race. The most cherished customs of other people are precisely those which they take a delight in ignoring. What possible harm did it do them that the Polish Jews liked to wear beards? These were shaved off in the street, amid the jeering of German soldiers. And that was about the mildest treatment anyone received in their country. It was resolved that citizens should be evacuated, so that their comfortable houses should be placed at the disposal of Germans; this was done in the most inconsiderate manner possible, by awakening people in the middle of the night and ordering them, at the point of the bayonet, to leave instantly, whether dressed or not, and with no luggage beyond a small bag. Then they were driven perhaps into a field, no matter if it was deep in snow, no matter if some of the evicted were women about to bear children. Of the actual murders we cannot begin to speak, for they were innumerable; and, as these photographs show, the soldiers who carried them out enjoyed them enormously. 'But,' wrote a certain Herr Lemke in the *Warschauer Zeitung* of July 27, 1940, 'it would be a great mistake to think that after the notable successes of German policy and of the talented German High Command there has been any disillusionment or revision of view among the Polish population.' He blames the Polish intellectuals who, he says, have 'poisoned' the other classes of the population. Here, at any rate, is one German who recognizes that all the horrors his people perpetrated will recoil on their own heads.

A book such as *Retribution* is most opportune, especially when it is written with Mr. Abrahams's unanswerable logic and with all the difficulties taken into account. This time the victors will not allow the whine of the Germans to soften their hearts and from a recent pronouncement by Goebbels it appears that the more realistic of them do not expect it. One item, as Mr. Abrahams suggests, might well be the complete de-industrialization of a country which has planned that the rest of Europe shall merely supply her needs. It is all to the good that this time our sentimentalism will be forced to take into account the Russian programme for Germany, to say nothing of that on which so many peoples of Europe have every right to insist. 'We shall lose the effect of this war,' says Mr. Abrahams, who is a most competent and far-seeing lawyer, 'if we do not destroy Germany . . . to shrink from the task is simply bad surgery.' His book should be widely read and I hope he will be invited to be one of 'the boys in the back room' when the terms are delivered to the Germans.

HENRY BAERLEIN.

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